ESSAYS ON MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE by BAE, KYOUNG HUN
ABSTRACT
Title of dissertation: ESSAYS ON MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE
Kyoung Hun Bae, Doctor of Philosophy, 2015
Dissertation directed by: Professor Albert “Pete” Kyle
Department of Finance
This dissertation includes two essays on topics related to market microstruc-
ture. In the first essay, we analyze algorithmic trading in the Korean Index Futures
market. We document that short-term traders consistently anticipate the order flow
of large traders that build large positions within a short period of time. We study
trade-by-trade data around 36,164 trades by large traders among the largest 1% of all
active trades during 66 trading days in 2009 from the Korean Index Futures market.
We find that large traders manage their orders first by executing small, positively
correlated trades, which are followed by a single large trade. While the small trades
are executed, short-term traders gradually increase their inventories in the direction
of the forthcoming large trade. After the execution of the large trade, short-term
traders unload their inventories to other traders. We find that short-term traders
correctly anticipate the direction of large trades 56.06% of the time. Furthermore,
the aggregate positions of short-term traders are statistically significant predictors
for the direction of large trades that will arrive within 120 seconds.
In the second essay, we explore market microstructure invariance in the Korean
stock market. We define the number of buy-sell switching points based on the number
of times that individual traders change the direction of their trading. Based on the
hypothesis that switching points take place in business time, market microstructure
invariance predicts that the aggregate number of switching points is proportional to
the 2/3 power of the product of dollar volume and volatility. Using trading data
from the Korea Exchange (KRX) from 2008 to 2010, we estimate the exponent to be
0.675 with standard error of 0.005. Invariance explains about 93% of the variation
in the logarithm of the number of switching points each month across stocks.
ESSAYS ON MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE
by
Kyoung Hun Bae
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment




Professor Albert “Pete” Kyle, Chair/Advisor
Professor Steven L. Heston
Professor Mark Loewenstein
Professor Anna Obizhaeva





I am indebted to my dissertation advisors, Albert S. “Pete” Kyle, Steve Heston,
Mark Loewenstein, Anna A. Obizhaeva, and John Chao for their invaluable guidance.
I am very thankful to Don Bowen, Joon Chae, Peter Dixon, Eun Jung Lee, Yoon
Jung Lee, Wei Li, Richmond Mathews, Alberto Rossi, Shrihari Santosh, Austin
Starkweather, Tonia Wang and participants at the University of Maryland seminars
for their comments and discussions.
ii
Table of Contents
List of Figures v
1 Can Short-term Trading Algorithms Anticipate Large Order Executions? 1
1.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Two-Period Model: Large Trader’s Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Institutional Background and Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4 Identifying Large, Short-term, and Small Traders . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.5 Large Order Executions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.6 Order-Anticipation Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.6.1 “Child Order Size” and Order Exposure Probability . . . . . . 38
1.6.2 Large Trade Size and Order Exposure Probability . . . . . . . 47
1.7 Order-Anticipation Horizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
1.7.1 Order-Anticipation Horizon across Large Trades . . . . . . . . 51
1.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2 An Invariance Relationship in the Number of Buy-Sell Switching Points 62
2.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.2 Market Microstructure Invariance, Business Time, and Switching Points 63
2.3 The South Korean Stock Market Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.4 Trading Activity and Switching Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.5 Number of Switching Points and Different Types of Traders . . . . . 78
2.6 Effective Relative Tick Size, Index Inclusion, and Other Explanatory
Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.7 Decomposition into the Number of Accounts and the Number of Switch-
ing Points per Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86





1.1 Characteristics of Large Trades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.2 Event Study Using Large Trades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.3 Average Inventories around Large Trades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.4 Relative Prices around Large Trades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.5 Consistent Order-Anticipation by Short-term Traders . . . . . . . . . 37
1.6 Consistent Profits of Short-term Traders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.1 Aggregate Number of Switching Points ln(Sit) against Trading Activ-
ity ln(Wit/W
∗) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.2 Time Series of Monthly Regression Coefficients . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.3 Aggregate Number of Switching Points ln(Sit) against Trading Activ-
ity ln(Wit/W
∗) for different types of investors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.4 The Number of Unique Accounts ln(Nit) against Trading Activity
ln(Wit/W
∗) for different types of investors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.5 The Average Number of Switching Points per Account ln(Sit/Nit)
against Trading Activity ln(Wit/W
∗) for different types of investors . 89
v
Chapter 1: Can Short-term Trading Algorithms Anticipate Large Or-
der Executions?
1.1 Overview
How trading algorithms affect financial markets has been largely debated. Cur-
rent literature assesses the market influence of algorithms as a whole, overlooking
the differences among the various types of algorithms and the complexity of their
interactions. Taking this into account, we disaggregate the algorithms by their char-
acteristics as the first step in the attempt to answer the question. Using account-level
data, in which dynamics among all algorithms are presented, this paper asks whether
short-term trading algorithms can anticipate the order flow of large order execution
algorithms, and then examines the influence of this anticipation on each trading
entity.
When building or unloading large positions within a short time, a large trader
has an incentive to reduce price impact cost by hiding her order flow. To minimize
the price impact cost within a set time constraint, theory might suggest that the large
trader should split her order into smaller orders of similar-size. Such an execution
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strategy would not be optimal under a time constraint, because the early trades
in the order flow sequence would be large enough to reveal the entire order flow to
short-term traders trying to profit by trading ahead of the large trader. Furthermore,
the large trader is not better off pursuing a strategy of executing just one large order
to hide her order flow, as this would incur even larger price impact, increasing overall
transaction costs.1
To examine the trade-off faced by large traders, we develop a simple two-period
model based on Bertsimas and Lo (1998), in which a large trader decides how to
split a large purchase or sale of a risky asset over two periods. In the model, there
exists a short-term trader who receives a signal based on the order flow in period
one and becomes informed about the large trader’s second trade with a probability
that is endogenous to the large trader’s first trade size. In equilibrium, the large
trader reveals her order flow to the short-term trader to the extent that the marginal
benefits of smoothing out her trades offset the marginal costs of revealing her second
trade to the short-term trader.
In the model, there is one risky asset, whose price follows an arithmetic random
walk with a constant linear price impact. The large trader’s objective is to minimize
the transaction costs of demanding a large number of shares of the risky asset within
two periods. The short-term trader anticipates the second trade of the large trader
1Reference Harris (1997) for the concept of order exposure.
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and uses this knowledge to maximize his profits from the price impact caused by the
large trader. This model produces the following order-anticipation dynamics between
the large trader and the short-term trader: (1) Short-term traders anticipate the
autocorrelated trades of large traders with a probability greater than random chance
based on order flow information. (2) In the presence of short-term traders, when
building large positions, it is optimal for large traders to trade small, positively
correlated “child orders”, which are followed by a large trade. (3) Short-term traders
exit their positions when large traders initiate a large trade. (4) If large traders trade
with bigger “child orders” before initiating a large trade, their large trade following
the “child orders” is more likely to be anticipated by short-term traders.
We document order-anticipation dynamics between large traders and short-
term traders with comprehensive data that contains the complete dynamics among
all traders at an account level in the Korea index futures market for 66 consecutive
trading days beginning in March 26, 2009. In our empirical analysis, short-term
traders are identified as traders whose inventories are strongly mean-reverting. This
is defined as (1) having an average holding time per position of less than 3 minutes,
(2) having an average daily ratio of overnight inventories to their own contracts
traded of less than 0.01%, and (3) trading with an active order more often than
with a passive order. Large traders are identified as traders who are not short-term
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traders and initiate at least one trade among the largest 1% of all trades during the
sample period. All other traders are classified as “small traders”. During the sample
period, large traders initiate 36,164 such large trades. We find that, conditional of
a large trade being executed, short-term traders correctly anticipate the direction of
the large trades 56.06% of the time by taking a long position in advance of a large
buy order or a short position in advance of a large sell order. This result suggests
that short-term traders are informed about the direction of the forthcoming large
trades with a probability greater than random chance and that they profit from the
price impact caused by large traders.
A simple event study is used around the execution of large trades to describe
order-anticipation dynamics among the large, short-term, and small traders. We find
that, prior to initiating a large trade, large traders smooth out their large demand
with small “child orders” in the direction of the forthcoming large trade. During
this period of “child orders”, short-term traders gradually increase their inventories
in the direction of the large trade as if they are informed about the direction of the
large trade. When large traders initiate a large trade, the price jumps because of the
price impact of the large trade, and short-term traders are likely to be on the right
side, profiting from the price impact caused by the large trade. As the large order
arrives, short-term traders begin to liquidate their positions by trading against small
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traders who want to actively trade to respond to new information learned from the
large trade.
We examine the order-anticipation horizon of short-term traders, using predic-
tive regressions with 5 to 240 seconds time intervals. We find that in all predictive
regressions, the aggregate positions of short-term traders are statistically sufficient
and significant predictors for the direction of large trades that will arrive in a short
period of time. Furthermore, in the predictive regressions, the coefficient of the ag-
gregate positions of short-term traders monotonically increases as the time intervals
become longer. This suggests that their order-anticipation strategy is not based on
an extremely low latency.
Our empirical results support the order-anticipation dynamics implied by the
model. When large traders build or unload large positions, they try to slowly accu-
mulate their desired positions by splitting their large orders to minimize price impact
by hiding their order flow from short-term traders. Because of limited liquidity and
time constraints to fill their large orders, large traders encounter a trade-off between
trading faster and not revealing their order flow to short-term traders. When schedul-
ing their orders, large traders rationally expect that short-term traders extract some
order flow information from their “child orders”. Therefore, large traders build or
unload their inventory with small “child orders” early on, and at the very last mo-
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ment on their time constraint, they initiate a large trade to finish filling their large
order. In equilibrium, large traders reveal their order flow information to short-term
traders to the extent that the marginal benefits of smoothing out their trades offset
the marginal costs of revealing their order flow to short-term traders. Therefore, be-
fore a large trade, short-term traders anticipate a sequence of autocorrelated trades
initiated by large traders. The large trade then provides an exit point to short-term
traders, who rationally expect that large traders finish executing their large orders
with a large trade and that small traders will want to actively trade in the direction
of the large trade to respond to new information learned from large traders.
In addition to the literature on order execution and order exposure, this pa-
per is connected with multiple other strands of literature including the market mi-
crostructure invariance hypothesis proposed by Kyle and Obizhaeva (2013) and high
frequency trading. Using an event study approach to analyze repetitive large trades,
we can clearly describe order-anticipation dynamics among large, short-term, and
small traders. When applying the event study methodology, we use a time invariant
trading sequence instead of physical time based on the invariance hypothesis sug-
gesting that “market microstructure properties become constant when measured in
units of business time”. This intuition from the invariance hypothesis is essential
in our analysis since market microstructure noise is substantial in the physical time
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domain, and we can mitigate the noise by aggregating the data with time invariant
trading sequence in the event study.
We use vector autoregression analysis to show that short-term traders predict
short-term price changes by anticipating large trades initiated by large traders. In our
vector autoregression, we partition the trade-by-trade data with large trades instead
of a regular time interval. This approach is less subject to market microstructure
noise than a general method since trading activity between large trades is controlled
by the invariance hypothesis. According to the invariance hypothesis, “business
time” runs differently from physical time. Therefore, trading activity in regular
time intervals is not comparable because the level of risk transferred in regular time
intervals is not homogeneous. However, the time domain partitioned by large trades
is endogenous to trading activity since, if “business time” runs faster, large trades
are more likely to arrive in the market, therefore the time span between large trades
endogenously becomes smaller.
Our study is related to the high frequency trading (HFT) literature. There
is a controversial debate on whether HFT firms can use their faster trading speed
to trade ahead of institutions, thereby raising transaction costs for institutional in-
vestors; Brogaard et al. (2014), Clark-Joseph (2013), Hirschey (2013) and Li (2014).
Although we do not take a stand on whether short-term traders identified in this
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paper are HFT firms, we see that short-term traders have trading patterns similar
to those of HFT firms such as quickly mean-reverting inventories and low overnight
inventories. We also find that short-term traders make consistent profits and that
the size of “child orders” of large traders is the first order reason for the consistent
order-anticipation trading of short-term traders. This finding raises an important
issue in the HFT literature as “speed” may not be the first order reason for consis-
tent HFT firms profits. We need to distinguish between HFT profitability resulting
from a speed advantage versus order-anticipation trading based on public order flow
information.
The next section proceeds as follows. A simple two-period model is introduced
to provide intuition on the trade-off faced by large traders and to derive order-
anticipation dynamics between large and short-term traders. We then describe the
data and institutional background. Finally, using large trades as repetitive random
experiments, we document the order-anticipation dynamics implied by the model.
1.2 Two-Period Model: Large Trader’s Problem
When scheduling a large order for a risky asset, large traders face a trade-off
between order execution speed and order execution cost. Faster order execution
makes orders more expensive by making them easier to anticipate. To examine this
trade-off faced by large traders, we introduce a short-term trader anticipating the
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order flow of large trader to the two-period model developed by Bertsimas and Lo
(1998). In our economy, there is one riskless asset with zero interest rate and one
risky asset, whose price follows an arithmetic random walk with a constant linear
price impact. There exists one large trader and one short-term trader. The large
trader demands a large number of shares of the risky asset that have to be executed
within two periods, and her objective is to minimize transaction costs. The short-
term trader is informed about the large trader’s second trade with probability β,
which is assumed to be proportional to the large trader’s first trade size: β = α · |y1|,
where y1 is the large trader’s first trade, and α is a positive constant.
Let pt, xt and yt denote price, short-term trader’s trade and large trader’s trade,
respectively at time t = 1, 2.
For t = 1, 2, the price motion is
pt = pt−1 + λzt + εt, (1.1)
where zt = xt + yt, and λ is a linear price impact factor, which is assumed to be a
positive constant.
The short-term trader’s problem is
min
x1,x2
βE [p1x1 + p2x2] , s.t. x1 + x2 = 0. (1.2)
We assume that the short-term trader exits his entire positions at t = 2. Although
the model is fixed to end in two periods, in a real financial market, large trades
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would repeatedly arrive in the market, and short-term traders would consistently
anticipate the direction of large trades, if possible. Since large traders may demand
a risky asset in a different direction, whether long or short, short-term traders need
to exit their positions to be ready for anticipating the next large trader.
Given the price motion pt, we can rewrite the short-term trader’s problem:
min
x1
βλ (−x1 + y2)x1.
When the short-term trader is informed about the second trade of large trader, his
optimal trading is




The large trader’s problem is
min
y1,y2
{(1− β)E [p1y1 + p2y2|x1 = 0] + βE [p1y1 + p2y2|x1 = y2/2]} , (1.4)
s.t. y1 + y2 = Y .
When deciding a demand schedule, the large trader should consider the pos-
sibility that the short-term trader anticipates her second trade. This is because
order-anticipation trading by the short-term trader increases the total transaction
costs of the large trader. Furthermore, the large trader should consider how her first
trade affects the probability of her second trade being anticipated.
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The large trader faces a trade-off between smoothing out her trades and hiding
her second trade from the short-term trader. Without the order-anticipation of the
short-term trader, it is optimal for the large trader to evenly split her large trades
over two periods. With the order-anticipation of the short-term trader, it is optimal
for the large trader to reduce her first trade size to decrease the probability of her
second trade being anticipated. The expected transaction costs with and without
the order-anticipation by the short-term trader are






















We can rewrite the large trader’s problem of minimizing expected transaction























are the expected transaction costs when the large trader trades




are the benefits of smoothing out




/2 are the costs of revealing her second trade to the
short-term trader. In equilibrium, the large trader chooses y1 such that the marginal
benefits of smoothing out her trades offset the marginal costs of revealing her second
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trade to the short-term trader. At the optimum, the large trader optimally chooses























The equilibrium is defined as the price motion {p∗1, p∗2}, the large trader’s
demand schedule for the risky asset {y∗1, y∗2} and the short-term trader’s order-
anticipation strategy {x∗1, x∗2} when he is informed about the large trader’s sec-
ond trade, y∗2, and the probability of order-anticipation by the short-term trader
β∗ = α · |y∗1|.
When the short-term trader is not informed about y∗2, he cannot strategically
trade to extract more information about the large trader’s second trade because both
the short-term trader and the larger trader are risk-neutral. If we introduce small
amounts of trading fees proportional to the trading volume to the short-term trader,
it is optimal for the short-term trader not to trade when he is not informed about
the large trader’s second trade.
The total demand for the risky asset of the large trader, Y , is assumed to be
a large number, which would determine the signs in the comparative statics analysis
below. A few important comparative statics results are noted: (1) In equilibrium,
2There exist two solutions that satisfy the first order condition. Since the large trader minimizes
the transaction costs, the solution chosen is the unique one with the second order condition being
positive.
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the short-term trader anticipates the large trader’s second trade with a probability
greater than random chance since β > 0 for all Y . (2) In the presence of the
short-term trader, the large trader trades a small trade, which is followed by a large
trade: y∗2 > y
∗
1. (3) If the short-term trader can more accurately extract order flow
information from the large trader’s first trade (i.e. α increases), the marginal costs of
revealing the large trader’s second trade increase. Therefore, the large trader reduces


















(4) If the price impact factor becomes larger, the marginal benefits of smoothing out
trades increase. Then the large trader balances more evenly her trade size between
her first and second trade:










α2 − 2Y αλ+ 4λ2
< 0.
(5) If the large trader demands larger liquidity, her demands are more concentrated


















α2 − 2Y αλ+ 4λ2
< 0.
The model produces the following order-anticipation dynamics: (1) In equi-
librium, when large traders build or unload large positions within a short period
13
of time, short-term traders can anticipate the autocorrelated trades of large traders
with a probability greater than random chance based on order flow information. (2)
In the presence of short-term traders, when building large positions within a short
period of time, it is optimal for large traders to trade small “child orders”, which
are followed by a large trade. (3) Short-term traders exit their positions when large
traders initiate a large trade. (4) If large traders trade with bigger “child orders”
before initiating a large trade, their large trade is more likely to be anticipated by
short-term traders.
The model has a few limitations. First, the total demand Y of the large trader
is not endogenous to the price. In theory, large traders should endogenously adjust
their total demand, depending on the price changes. In a real financial market,
there are many cases in which large traders cannot change their demand, especially
in a short time. For instance, large traders may delegate the execution of large
demands to an execution agent, which will execute the requested large order within
a time constraint. Also, within an investment bank, deciding total demand could be
separated from executing it in that portfolio managers decide total demand of the
risky asset, and an execution department manages details of small orders which fill
the large order. Moreover, since we are modeling an execution decision over one to
two minutes, large traders have limited ability to react to a price change. Another
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limitation is that the model forces the large trader to trade over two periods. In
a real financial market, large traders trade over a multiple periods. To apply the
model to a real financial market, we may consider large trader’s first trade as all
“child orders” before large traders initiate a large trade, and her second trade as a
large trade belonging to the largest 1% of all trades during the sample period. Third,
there is no competition among large traders and short-term traders in the model.
It would be an interesting extension if we introduce multiple agents of large traders
and short-term traders competing on liquidity with correlated information.
1.3 Institutional Background and Data Description
The data is from the Korea Exchange (KRX hereafter). This section discusses
the market conditions and rules in the KRX as well as the data descriptions that give
us a unique opportunity to examine the complete dynamics among large, short-term,
and small traders.
The KRX is an automated centralized electronic market based on a limit order
book; it is the sole exchange that houses both the stock and derivatives market
in South Korea. Compared to the U.S. markets, its size is small but its intraday
trading is very active relative to the size. According the 2009 statistics published by
the World Federation of Exchanges, the market capitalization of the KRX reaches
one trillion USD, which is nearly 7% of NYSE’s, while the KRX has relatively high
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daily turnover of approximately 10% of NYSE’s. The intraday trading in the index
futures market is 5 times more active than in the stock market; traders in the KRX
hold 106,151 contracts of daily open interest, which mark 3% of those of the CME;
however, the notional value of daily trading volume takes nearly 20% of CME’s.
The data contains the complete records of trades and quotes time-stamped at
one millisecond with an encrypted account identification for 66 consecutive trading
days beginning in March 26, 2009.3 When several events occur in the limit order
book during the same millisecond, the order of the events is recorded in the proper
sequence in the data. Therefore, we can observe the complete dynamics of the limit
order book at an individual trader level. For instance, the data records a time-
stamp of the times of when a message is submitted and when an order is matched.
Therefore, when a trader submits a limit order, we can determine when this limit
order is matched or canceled at a millisecond precision. Furthermore, by comparing
the times of when a buyer and a seller sent their messages for each trade, it is possible
to accurately identify the trader that initiated the trade. That is, given a trade, if
the buyer sent a message later than the seller, then such a trade is a buyer-initiated
trade, which implies that the buyer crossed the bid-ask spread, and bought at the
ask price.
Another unique feature of this data is that we can identify whether a trader
3During this period, the KRX did not provide a collocation service to any trader.
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is an institution or a retail investor and also determine if it is a foreign or domestic
investor from the perspective of South Korean. Although we cannot rule out the
possibility that a domestic investor opens an account outside of South Korea so
that he is classified as a foreign investor, it is likely that foreign investors are foreign
investment banks, mutual funds or hedge funds that are actively trading in the KRX.
Our analysis focuses on the KOSPI 200 index futures market for the following
reasons. First, the KOSPI 200 index futures contract is one of the most liquid index
futures contracts in the World. Second, the underlying asset is a well-diversified
index, which is the KOSPI 200 index, a basket of two hundred major stocks listed in
the KRX. Therefore, there is not much idiosyncratic risk involved in trading the index
futures contract. This implies that an idiosyncratic shock from an individual stock
does not affect the index futures price to a large extent. Instead of idiosyncratic risk
in an individual stock, macro news such as interest rate changes, Chinese economic
growth forecast, etc. are major determinants of significant price changes in the
KOSPI 200 index futures contract.
An open outcry market does not exist for the KOSPI 200 index futures contract;
all contracts are traded electronically. In 2009, 83 million KOSPI 200 index futures
contracts were traded. Unlike the E-mini S&P 500 index futures contracts, which
are traded mostly by institutions, retail investors provide substantial liquidity to
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the KOSPI 200 index futures market. The substantial trading volume from retail
investors allows us to examine the interactions among large, short-term traders and
small traders who are mostly retail investors.
The notional value of one KOSPI 200 index futures contract is KOSPI 200
futures price times a multiplier of 500,000 Korean Won (KRW). The average notional
value of one contract during our sample period is USD 67,779, which is higher than
that of the E-mini S&P 500 index futures contract.4 Its tick size is 0.05, which is
about USD 19.37 or 2.86 basis points.
We analyze only the front month contracts. June 11, 2009, is the only expira-
tion date. Therefore, until June 11, 2009, we use the data of the June 2009 contract,
and after June 11, 2009, we use the September 2009 contract for our analysis. Since
the back month contracts were illiquid except for a few days right before or on the
expiration date, including the data on the back month contracts in our analysis does
not qualitatively change the results in this paper.
The daily price limit on the KOSPI 200 futures contracts is plus and minus
10% of previous closing price. There are few market conditions severe enough to
trigger a circuit breaker. During the sample period, the price fluctuated within the
daily price limit and a circuit breaker never came into effect.
4The average closing price is 174.97, and the average exchange rate is USD/KRW 1,290.73 during
our sample period.
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1.4 Identifying Large, Short-term, and Small Traders
The data tracks all traders in the market of 25,172 traders. We identify short-
term traders and large traders based on their trading records. Short-term traders are
identified by the following criteria: (1) An average holding time for one position is
less than 3 minutes.5 (2) An average daily ratio of overnight inventories to their own
contracts traded is less than 0.01%. (3) The number of contracts with a marketable
order is greater than the number of contracts with a non-marketable order.
Among all traders, excluding short-term traders, we identify a “large trader”
as a trader who initiated at least one large trade that belongs to the largest 1% of all
trades during the sample period. All other traders are classified as “small traders”.
During the sample period, the average daily volume was 348,114 contracts and
the notional value was USD 24 billion. Based on the three criteria above, of the 25,172
traders, 3% are classified as either short-term traders or large traders, which initiate
72% of daily volume. Large traders initiate 14% of daily volume with a large trade.
When a large trade is initiated, large traders trade against non-marketable orders of
large, short-term, and small traders by 46.05%, 10.22%, and 43.73%, respectively.
We observe 32 short-term traders who switch their positions as frequently as
5We define one position as a sequence of trades that maintain the same sign of the inventories.
For example, a long position starts from a zero-inventory, and retains the position as long as the
inventories are positive, and ends with the next zero-inventory.
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Panel A. Trader Entity
# Total # Foreign # Institution
Short-term Trader 32 5 24
Large Trader 737 179 557
Small Trader 24,403 391 3,057
Total 25,172 575 3,638
Panel B. Volume Ratio
Volume(%) Large Trade(%) Small Trade(%)
Trader Take Make Take Make Take Make
Short-term Trader 30.48 14.51 0.00 10.22 34.76 15.12
Large Trader 42.13 43.18 100.00 46.05 34.01 42.77
Small Trader 27.39 42.31 0.00 43.73 31.23 42.11
Daily Volume 348,114 (100%) 49,671 (14%) 298,443 (86%)
Panel C. Other Statistics
Mean Median Std.
# of Switch/Day
Short-term Trader 91.10 58.53 92.83
Large Trader 5.09 1.45 18.67
Small Trader 4.32 2.16 10.00
Switch Time(sec)
Short-term Trader 104.89 81.96 115.76
Large Trader 9,607.83 10,014.12 5,135.44
Small Trader 5,860.38 4,730.69 5,080.46
Overnight Ratio(%)
Short-term Trader 0.00 0.00 0.02
Large Trader 40.33 29.80 36.47
Small Trader 21.40 4.44 32.86
Table 1.1: This table reports summary statistics for large, short-term, and small traders.
The total volume consists of small trade (%) and large trade (%), which are expressed
as the proportion to the total volume. Large trades are defined as active trades by large
traders among the largest 1% of all active trades. We define one position as a sequence
of trades that retain the same sign of the inventories. The number(#) of Switch/Day is
daily average number of position changes such as changing from a long to short position or
vice versa. Switch Time(sec) is mean holding time for one position. Overnight Ratio(%)
is daily average ratio of overnight inventory to whole day trading volume by each trader.
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91.10 times per day. Their average holding time for one position is 104.89 seconds.
They liquidate most of their inventories at the end of day. This leads to the average
low overnight inventory ratio of 0.004%.
We identify 737 traders as large traders. They are long-term investors compared
to short-term traders, since they hold their positions for 2.7 hours on average. They
tend to take large directional positions, keeping a high overnight inventory ratio
compared to short-term traders. On average, they keep 40.33% of intraday trading
volume as overnight inventory. Large traders may be an execution algorithm, index
arbitrage, or portfolio insurance program that occasionally execute a large trade.
We conjecture that small traders are similar to noise traders in Kyle (1985)
since their trading volumes are small compared to those of short-term traders and
large traders, and 87% of small traders are domestic retail investors who may trade
for exogenous reasons.
1.5 Large Order Executions
Executing large trades is an economically significant event in the market for
the following reasons. First, large trades incur substantial price impact. Second, the
direction of large trades is uncertain to market participants except for the one who
initiates them. Traders are likely to be on the wrong side of large trades unless they
can consistently anticipate the trading direction of large trades. Thus, large trades
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Variable Mean Median Std. Max Min
Large Trade Size 78.76 62.00 40.74 800.00 50.00
# Large Trade per Day 547.94 531.00 109.30 951.00 334.00
Time btwn Large Trades (sec) 39.97 16.31 65.17 1,239.29 0.01
Volume btwn Large Trades 1,074.79 638.00 1,287.64 24,523.00 1.00
# Trades btwn Large Trades 489.33 281.00 612.58 11,253.00 1.00
# Message btwn Large Trades 848.49 471.00 1,108.84 22,220.00 0.00
Table 1.2: This table reports summary statistics of large trades. Large trades are defined
as active trades by large traders among the largest 1% of all active trades. We observe
36,164 of large trades, among which 48.99% are buyer-initiated and 51.01% are seller-
initiated. Buyer-initiated trade is a trade that the buyer crossed the bid-ask spread and
bought at the ask price. Similarly, seller-initiated trade is a trade that the seller sold at
the bid price.
cause negative skewness in the profits distribution of traders who are on the wrong
side.
Using the trade-by-trade data in the KOSPI 200 index futures market, we
define a “large trade” as an active trade by large traders among the largest 1% of
all active trades in the sample period. We observe 36,164 of such large trades during
the sample period. This paper analyzes 200 trades before and after large trades to
document the order-anticipation dynamics of large, short-term, and small traders.
Two hundred trades occur in approximately 1 minute.
The total number of large trades during the sample period is 36,164. The
minimum trade size to be considered as a large trade is 50 index futures contracts,
which have a notional value of 3.4 million USD. The mean size of large trades is
78.76 contracts. Of the 36,164 large trades, 48.99% are buyer-initiated, meaning
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that a large trader crossed the bid-ask spread and bought at least 50 contracts at
the ask price. Large trades occur 547.94 times per day on average. The average
time between two consecutive large trades is 39.97 seconds, during which 1,074.79
contracts are traded while 489.33 trades and 848.49 messages occur on average.
The number of large trades is distributed over the intraday trading hours in
a U-shape. The directions of large trades are positively autocorrelated. Panel A
of figure 1.1 plots the total number of large trades during the sample period in 10
minute intervals between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Panel B shows that the directions
of large trades are positively autocorrelated with the directions of up to 10 previous
large trades.
We use an event study to examine buying pressure, selling pressure, and price
changes around the execution of large trades. We calculate the mean active trades
and the mean relative price that have the same trading sequence around large trades.
For example, denote the price as p (i, j), where i indexes large trades, and j indexes
the trading sequence around the ith large trade. Let’s define the relative price such
that
p′ (i, j) = {lnp (i, j)− lnp (i, 0)} × 104,
where p (i, 0) is price at the ith large trade. The mean relative price p′ (j) can be
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A. Total Number of Large Trades in 10 Minute Intervals






B. Partial Autocorrelation Function of Large Trades
Figure 1.1: Large trades are defined as active trades by large traders among the largest
1% of all active trades. We observe 36,164 large trades in the KOSPI 200 index futures
market from March 26 to June 29, 2009. Panel A plots the total number of large trades
during the sample period in 10 minute intervals between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Panel
B shows the partial autocorrelation function of large trades. The sign and size of large
trades represent the trading direction and volume of large traders at each time when large








p′ (i, j) ,
where j indexes the trading sequence around large trades. Note that a negative value
j indicates a trade prior to large trades and a positive value j indicates a trade after
large trades. Due to difference in their dynamics, we aggregate buyer-initiated large
trades and seller-initiated large trades separately. The mean active trades and the
mean relative price are calculated by their trading sequence around large trades.
Figure 1.2 presents the mean active trades and the mean relative price around
large trades. The x-axis is the time invariant trading sequence centered at large
trades and the y-axis is either the mean active trades or the mean relative price.
In panel B of figure 1.2, the relative price increases slowly and monotonically
as the trading sequence approaches the execution of the large buyer-initiated trades.
The price jumps instantly at the execution, and the price is maintained for up to
200 trades after the execution.
Current literature provides a partial explanation for this price pattern. Gradu-
ally increasing price pattern before the execution point simulates the pattern gener-
ated by the order splitting of the informed trader (Kyle, 1985). Namely, the trader
with monopolistic information splits orders in building a large position while hiding
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Figure 1.2: Large trades are defined as active trades by large traders among the largest
1% of all active trades. We observe 36,164 large trades in the KOSPI 200 index futures
market from March 26 to June 29, 2009. The buyer-initiated trades and seller-initiated
trades account for 48.99% and 51.01% of large trades, respectively. Panel A plots the signed
active trades and prices on the time domain for 30 seconds. Panels B and C plot the mean
active trades and the mean relative price that have the same trading sequence around large
trades. Panels B and C aggregate the buyer-initiated trades and seller-initiated trades,
respectively. The relative price p′ (i, j) is defined as {ln p (i, j)− ln p (i, 0)} × 104, where i
indexes large trades and j indexes the trading sequence around the ith large trade.
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trader does not anticipate neither the large order execution nor the price jump.
In order to explain the price jump occurred by large order executions, we
separate the traders that initiated the large orders from other traders, and track their
trading behavior around large order executions. In addition, we decompose remaining
traders by short-term trader and small traders, and compare their behaviors with
that of large traders.
1.6 Order-Anticipation Dynamics
We analyze order-anticipation dynamics around the execution of large trades
using a simple event study. The traders are decomposed into three groups: short-
term traders, small traders and large traders who initiated large trades. We calculate
the average inventories of the 3 groups of traders around large trades by the direction
of large trades and that of aggregate positions of short-term traders.
Figure 1.3 presents the average inventories of large, short-term, and small
traders as a function of trading sequence centered at large trades. Figure 1.4 plots
the average relative prices as a function of trading sequences centered at large trades.
In figure 1.3 and 1.4, the panels for the seller-initiated large trades are symmetric
with those for the buyer-initiated large trades.
Figure 1.3 compares 4 combinations generated by two directions of large trades
and two aggregate positions of short-term traders. The aggregate positions of short-
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A. Large Long, Short-term Long (26.83%)
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B. Large Long, Short-term Short (22.16%)




















C. Large Short, Short-term Short (29.23%)
−200 −100 0 100 200
Trading Sequence
D. Large Short, Short-term Long (21.78%)
Figure 1.3: Using an event study, this figure plots the average inventories of large, short-
term, and small traders around large trades. We analyze 36,164 large trades during the
sample period. The x-axis is the time invariant trading sequence centered at large trades,
and the y-axis is the number of contracts. Two hundred trades occur in approximately 1
minute. The thick dashed line represents the average inventories of passively traded large
traders. Panels A and C plot the average inventories when short-term traders correctly
anticipate the direction of large trades. Panels B and D plot the average inventories when
short-term traders incorrectly anticipate the direction of large trades. The ratio in the title
indicates the proportion of each panel among total large trades.
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term traders are likely to be on the right side of large trades. When large traders
initiate a large buy order, the aggregate positions of short-term traders are long
54.77% of the time. Similarly, when large traders initiated a large sell order, the
aggregate positions of short-term traders are short 57.3% of the time.
When short-term traders are on the right side of large trades, the aggregate
positions of short-term traders gradually increase as if they are informed about the
direction of the forthcoming large trade approximately 200th trade prior to large
trades (Panels A and C of figure 1.3). At the execution of large trades, short-term
traders trade against large traders instantly, and their positions shrink. Short-term
traders recover some of their positions after the immediate response. They slowly
exit their positions entirely by unloading the positions to small traders and other
large traders who demand liquidity to respond to new information from large trades.
Figure 1.3 also details how large traders build their positions. Large traders
manage their orders by executing small, positively correlated trades, which are fol-
lowed by a single large trade. This order execution pattern is consistent with the
strategy of large traders trying to reduce the price impact of their large demand in
the presence of short-term traders, thereby minimizing overall transaction cost.
Figure 1.4 tracks relative prices around large trades. When short-term traders
are on the right side of large trades, the price slowly moves toward the price at
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A. Large Long, Short-term Long (26.83%)
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C. Large Short, Short-term Short (29.23%)
−200 −100 0 100 200
Trading Sequence
D. Large Short, Short-term Long (21.78%)
Figure 1.4: Using an event study, this figure plots the average relative prices around large
trades. We analyze 36,164 of large trades during the sample period. The relative price
p′ (i, j) is defined as {ln p (i, j)− ln p (i, 0)}×104, where i indexes large trades and j indexes
the trading sequence around the ith large trade. The x-axis is the time invariant trading
sequence centered at large trades. The y-axis is the relative price(bps). Two hundred
trades occur in approximately 1 minute. Panels A and C plot the average relative prices
when short-term traders correctly anticipate the direction of large trades. Panels B and D
plot the average relative prices when short-term traders incorrectly anticipate the direction
of large trades. The ratio in the title indicates the proportion of each panel among total
large trades. 30
the execution of large trades (Panels A and C). This price pattern is generated
by demand pressure from both large traders splitting their trades and short-term
traders anticipating the order flow of large traders. Their competition for liquidity
contributes to the price discovery by making the price converge to the fundamental
value at the execution of large trades.
Panels B and D in Figure 1.3 and 1.4 track three groups of traders when short-
term traders are on the wrong side of large trades. The average inventories in Figure
1.3 shows that short-term traders quickly reverse their inventories when they are on
the wrong side of large trades. We conjecture that such behavior is the strategy
taken by short-term traders to minimize their losses, because they expect that small
traders will trade actively to respond to large trades.
Such behavior is distinguished from the behavior of short-term traders when
they are on the right side of large trades. Short-term traders do not unload their
positions quickly since they expect that small traders will actively trade in the direc-
tion of large trades. They are better off exiting their positions with a passive order
instead of an active order to maximize their profits.
Short-term traders face trade-off between favorable price and order information
accuracy when they build positions. They are better off building their positions
quickly before their competitors push the price. However, early position building
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increases the risk of being on the wrong side of large trades, because they are less
informed about the order flow. Therefore, trading speed prior to large trades is not
as critical as that after large trades, especially when short-term traders are on the
wrong side.
In summary, when large traders build or unload large positions within a short
period of time, they want to slowly accumulate their desired positions by smoothing
out their large order to minimize price impact and to hide their order flow from short-
term traders. Theoretically, such as the informed trader in Kyle (1985), large traders
want to perfectly smooth out their trades, but in a real financial market, because of
competition with other large traders who have correlated information, and because
of limited liquidity, large traders have a time constraint on their order, within which
they have to fill their large order. Under this condition, large traders have a trade-
off between smoothing out their trades and hiding their order flow from short-term
traders. Large traders rationally expect that short-term traders extract their order
flow information from their early trades. Therefore, they shift some demand in their
earlier trades to later trades as shown in the model, in which the large trader shifts
some shares of the first trade to the second trade. At the very last moment on
their time constraint, large traders have to initiate a large trade to fill their large
order. In equilibrium, large traders reveal their order flow information to short-term
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traders to the extent that the marginal benefits of smoothing out trades offset the
marginal costs of revealing their order flow to short-term traders. Therefore, near
the execution of large trades, there are short-term traders anticipating a sequence of
autocorrelated trades of large traders. Large trades provide an exit point to short-
term traders as short-term traders rationally expect that large traders fill their large
order with a large trade.
To formally test whether short-term traders anticipate large trades, we run
a simple regression to test the null hypothesis that the probability of short-term
traders being on the right side of large trades is less than or equal to 50%. Let y t
be the sign of the tth large trade: Plus 1 is a buyer-initiated trade, and minus 1 is a
seller-initiated trade. Let x i,t be the sign of positions of short-term trader i at the
tth large trade: Plus 1 is a long position, and minus 1 is a short position.6
y t = β0 · x i,t +
15∑
j=1
γj · y t−j + αi + εt, (1.9)
where αi represents a fixed effect of short-term traders. The null hypothesis is that
β0 ≤ 0. To control for the autocorrelation of large trades, we include lagged large
trades. We choose the number of lags based on the partial autocorrelation function
of large trades in figure 1.1.
6The subscript i indexes short-term traders.
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Model Estimate S.E. t value Pr(≤ |t|) Adj. R2
Panel A. Direction of Trade and Position
Simple OLS
(Intercept) −0.021 0.002 −10.005 0.000
0.004
xi,t 0.063 0.002 29.493 0.000
Fixed Effect xi,t 0.064 0.002 29.617 0.000 0.004
Fixed Effect xi,t 0.036 0.002 16.766 0.000 0.041
+ Lag y
∑15
j=1 yt−j 0.365 0.006 61.817 0.000
Panel B. Direction× Size of Trade and Position
Simple OLS
(Intercept) −1.023 0.019 −5.371 0.000
0.004
xi,t 0.085 0.003 29.112 0.000
Fixed Effect xi,t 0.085 0.003 29.092 0.000 0.004
Fixed Effect xi,t 0.050 0.003 17.150 0.000 0.040
+ Lag y
∑15
j=1 yt−j 0.350 0.006 58.651 0.000
Table 1.3: This table tests the null hypothesis that the probability of short-term traders
being on the right side of large trades is less than or equal to 50%. The dependent variable
is y t, which is the direction of the t
th large trade: Plus 1 is a buyer-initiated trade and
minus 1 is a seller-initiated trade. The subscript t indexes large trades. The independent
variable is x i,t, which is the position of the i
th short-term trader at the tth large trade: Plus
1 is a long position and minus 1 is a short position. There are 32 of short-term traders and
36,164 of large trades. The number of observation is 217,583.
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The regressions in panel A in table 1.3 reject the null hypothesis β0 ≤ 0. This
implies that the probability of short-term traders being on the right side of large
trades is statistically strictly greater than 50%, and that short-term traders can
anticipate large trades initiated by large traders.
Regression (1.9) is not a spurious regression because both the dependent vari-
able and the independent variables are a stationary time series and there is no coin-
tegration between them. That is, y t is the sign of the t
th large trade, which is a
stationary time series, and x i,t is the sign of the positions of short-term trader i at
the tth large trade, which is a strongly mean-reverting process. This variable indi-
cates whether short-term traders actively trade and take a long or short position
prior to the tth large trade. Since short-term traders switch their positions as fre-
quently as 91 times per day, either from a long to short position or vice versa, the
sign of positions of short-term traders at the tth large trade is a stationary process.
Regression (1.9) is a predictive regression. If x i,t indicates a direction of short-
term traders, β0 implies the likelihood that short-term traders correctly anticipate
the direction of large trades.
If we use the actual size and the direction of large trades along with the actual
positions of short-term traders instead of +1 or −1 for y t and x i,t in regression (1.9),
the signs and their statistical significance are the same with those from the regression
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with +1 and −1. See panel B in table 1.3. However, the regression with +1 and
−1 is more meaningful in that β0 has a simple interpretation associated with the
probability of short-term traders being on the right side of large trades such that
P [y t = x i,t] = E [y t · x i,t] /2 + 1/2
≈ β0/2 + 1/2 = 52.05%.
Based on the regression result in table 1.3, short-term traders are on the right side of
large trades with a probability 53.50% when not controlling for the autocorrelation
of large trades, and 52.05% when controlling for the autocorrelation.
We do not drop any large trades that were initiated by large traders during
trading hours except the beginning and closing times. As long as a short-term trader
has an open position when a large trader initiate a large trade, this is included as an
observation in regression (1.9)
Short-term traders consistently anticipate the direction of large trades with a
probability greater than 50%. We run regression (1.9) with every two consecutive
trading days of the data, and plot the time series of β0 in figure 1.5.
Figure 1.5 demonstrates that the probability of short-term traders being on the
right side of large trades is consistently greater than 50% over the sample period.
To illustrate the economic significance of order-anticipation strategy by short-
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Figure 1.5: This figure plots the time series of β0 estimated in two-day interval during the
sample period: y t = β0 · x i,t +
∑15
j=1 γj · y t−j + αi + εt, where the subscript t indexes large
trades, and y t is the direction of the t
th large trade: Plus 1 is a buyer-initiated trade and
minus 1 is a seller-initiated trade. The variable x i,t is the position of the i
th short-term
trader at the tth large trade: Plus 1 is a long position and minus 1 is a short position. Our
null hypothesis is β0 ≤ 0, which implies that the probability of short-term traders being on
the right side of large trades is less than or equal to 50%. The shade area represents a 95%
confidence interval. The coefficient β0 is related to the probability of short-term traders
being on the right side of large trades such that P [y t = x i,t] ≈ β0/2 + 1/2
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if they are on the wrong side, and gain one tick price if they are on the right side
of large trades. Also, let’s assume that short-term traders trade just one futures
contract in their order-anticipation trading strategy. There are 548 large trades per
day on average. Short-term trader’s net profits per day would be 548 × (0.52 −
0.48) × 1 tick × 1 contract × multiplier = 548 × 0.04 × 20 USD = 438 USD. These
profits would be consistent across trading days. If short-term traders can replicate
their order-anticipation strategy with 50 contracts instead of one contract, the total
profits of all 32 short-term traders would be 438× 50× 32 = 700,800 USD per day.
Short-term traders may attemp similar strategies not only in futures markets but
also in options markets, and they may use their strategies in other international
markets. The profits can become economically significant.
Short-term traders make consistent profits with a positive skewness. We aggre-
gate the mark-to-market profits of all short-term traders in one hour intervals during
our sample period, and normalize them to have a standard deviation of one. Figure
1.6 is the histogram of the mark-to-market profits aggregated across all short-term
traders.
1.6.1 “Child Order Size” and Order Exposure Probability
The order-anticipation dynamics in the model is mainly driven by the assump-
tion that, if the large trader increases her first trade size, the short-term trader is
38

















Figure 1.6: This figure plots the histogram of mark-to-market profits aggregated across
all short-term traders in one hour interval during the sample period. The mark-to-market
profits are normalized to a standard deviation of one.
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more likely to be informed about her second trade. To validate this assumption, we
take the data to the model as follows. We consider the large trader’s second trade
as large trades belonging to the largest 1% of all trades during the sample period,
and consider the large trader’s first trade as all small “child orders”. For each large
trade, we compute the mean size of small “child orders”, and test whether short-
term traders are more likely to anticipate a large trade initiated by a large trader
who traded with bigger “child orders” before initiating the large trade.
As a competing hypothesis, we test whether the trading speed of large traders
affects the probability of large trades being anticipated by short-term traders. The
trading speed of large traders is measured with order matching and submission times
in all passive trades of large traders. If large traders are faster, they are more likely
to be in the front of queue in the limit order book by responding to market conditions
faster than others. Therefore, the difference between order matching and submission
times would be smaller for faster large traders. To measure large trader’s speed,
we take the mean differences between order matching and submission times for all
matched passive orders of the large trader. The reason to use only the passive orders
is that the difference between order matching and submission times in an active trade
is subject to the latency within the exchange servers instead of the latency between
the exchange servers and large traders.
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The idea that “child order” size affects the probability of order-anticipation is
not new. Harris (1997) argues that “the aggregate order size may then attract a
costly response from other traders”. The market makers in Kyle (1985) respond to
the trade size of the informed trader by making the market thin when the market
makers expect that the informed trader will demand large liquidity. The idea that
the trading speed matters in order-anticipation by short-term traders is not new,
either. Clark-Josep (2012) and Hirschey (2013) argue that HFT firms can trade
ahead of others with their speed advantage. Li (2014) develops a theoretical model
in which HFT firms can anticipate the order flow of all other traders due to their
speed advantage. What we are testing in this section is whether “child order size” or
“speed” affects the probability of short-term traders being on the right side of large
trades.
The ideal experiment to test whether “child order size” or “speed” affects the
probability of order-anticipation by short-term traders would be a random exper-
iment, in which “child order size” and “speed” are randomly assigned to other-
wise identical large traders (or their characteristics except for “child order size” and
“speed” are randomly distributed), and compare the order exposure probabilities of
the trader groups that have various “child order size” and “speed”. The first issue
to implement the ideal experiment is that “child order size” and “speed” may be
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positively correlated if traders with more capital are more likely to invest in increas-
ing their trading speed. To address the correlation between “child order size” and
“speed”, we test the null hypotheses associated with “child order size” and “speed”,
both separately and jointly. The second issue is that characteristics of large traders
except for “child order size” and “speed” may not be identical or not be randomly
distributed. However, we argue that most characteristics of large traders except for
“child order size” and “speed” are unobservable to short-term traders. Therefore,
from the perspective of short-term traders, large traders are almost identical, expect
for “child order size” and “speed”. Furthermore, since large traders should random-
ize their trades and try to find the best time to manage their large orders, such
trading behaviors would make it hard for us to reject the two null hypotheses.
Let xci,t be the mean trade size between the (t− 3)th and the tth large trade
traded by the large trader who initiated the tth large trade. Let DBt be a dummy
variable indicating whether xci,t is greater than or equal to the median of x
c
i,t during
the sample period. The dummy variable DBt = +1 indicates that a large trader uses
a relatively big child order compared to other large traders before initiating the tth
large trade. Similarly, let DSt be a dummy variable indicating whether the speed of
large trader who initiates the tth large trade is slower than the median speed of larger
traders. The dummy variable DSt = +1 indicates that the large trader who initiates
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the tth large trade is more likely to be in the back of queue in the limit order book
than other large traders, and the average time difference between order matching
and submission times in her passive trades is longer than the median difference of
all large traders.
Using the dummy variables, DBt and D
S
t indicating the “child order” size and

















y t = x i,t|DSt = 0
]
≤ 0.
Given the two null hypotheses above, we design a simple regression to test two
hypotheses:
y t =β1 ·DSt ·DBt · x i,t + β2 ·DSt · x i,t + β3 ·DBt · x i,t
+ β4 · x i,t +
15∑
j=1
γj · y t−j +DSt ·DBt +DSt +DBt + αi + εt.
Based on the regression, we can rewrite our null hypotheses as follows:
Ha0 : β3 ≤ 0, β1 + β3 ≤ 0
Hb0 : β2 ≤ 0, β1 + β2 ≤ 0.
A linear hypothesis test rejects Ha0 with a p-value less than 0.001 since β3 > 0
and β1 + β3 > 0, and rejects H
b
0 with a p-value less than 0.005 since β2 > 0 and
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Model Covariate Estimate S.E. t value Pr(≤ |t|) Adj. R2
Child Size
x i,t −0.019 0.003 −6.392 0.000
0.043DBt · x i,t 0.110 0.004 26.183 0.000∑15
j=1 y t−j 0.363 0.006 61.634 0.000
Speed
x i,t 0.021 0.003 6.684 0.000
0.041DSt · x i,t 0.026 0.004 6.253 0.000∑15
j=1 y t−j 0.364 0.006 61.583 0.000
Child Size
+ Speed
x i,t −0.031 0.005 −6.103 0.000
0.044
DSt · x i,t 0.018 0.006 2.879 0.004
DBt · x i,t 0.086 0.006 13.318 0.000
DSt ·DBt · x i,t 0.059 0.009 6.909 0.000∑15
j=1 y t−j 0.362 0.006 61.513 0.000
Table 1.4: This table tests the “child order size” and “speed” hypotheses, separately and
jointly. Let xci,t be the mean size of child orders between the (t− 3)th and the tth large trade
traded by the large trader who initiated the tth large trade. The speed of large traders
is measured by the mean differences between order matching and submission times for all
matched passive orders of large traders. The dummy variable DBt indicates whether x
c
i,t is
greater than or equal to the median of xci,t during the sample period. The dummy variable
DSt indicates the speed of the large trader who initiates the t
th large trade is slower than
the median speed of large traders.
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β1 + β2 > 0. This result implies that if large traders use bigger “child orders”
with slower trading speed before initiating a large trade, their large trade is more
likely to be anticipated by short-term traders. Although large traders can reduce
the probability of order-anticipation by being faster, they cannot completely avoid
order-anticipation by short-term traders if their “child order” size before initiating a
large trade is relatively bigger than that of other large traders.
If we interpret DSt as a dummy variable indicating whether large traders use
a trading algorithm to execute their large orders, the result implies that although
an execution algorithm helps large traders to hide their order flow, large traders
cannot completely avoid order-anticipation by short-term traders if they demand
large liquidity within a short period of time.
Our tests have a few limitations. First, the regressions in table 1.4 cannot test
whether an extreme low latency affects the probability of order-anticipation since
the proxy for speed is not a good measure for the extreme low latency. It is possible
that HFT firms exploit their extreme low latency to anticipate the order flow of large
traders, but these tests cannot reveal whether HFT firms have the capability to do
so. Second, the assumption that other characteristics of large traders are randomly
distributed or not observable to short-term traders may not be valid. Large traders
may have trading characteristics that are observable and correlated with “child order
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size”, and it is possible that such characteristics are driving the results in table 1.4.
The results in table 1.4 do not conflict with the findings in Clark-Josep (2012),
Hirschey (2012) and Li (2014). It is perfectly possible that HFT firms can trade ahead
of institutions or informed traders based on their extreme low latency. What we are
arguing in this paper is that in addition to the “trading speed” of large traders, “child
order size” is an important factor that affects the probability of order-anticipation
since “child orders” of large traders may reveal information about the forthcoming
large trade to short-term traders.
The results in table 1.4 along with order-anticipation dynamics imply that the
trading speed is important to short-term traders. The “speed” of large traders affects
the probability that short-term traders are on the right side of large trades, and the
“speed” of short-term traders is valuable when they are on the wrong side of large
trades. See panels B and D in figure 1.3. When large traders initiate a large trade,
and if short-term traders are on the wrong side of it, short-term traders need to
get out of their positions as quickly as possible since they expect small traders to
respond to the large trade by trading actively against their positions. Therefore,
“speed” is valuable to short-term traders in the sense that if short-term traders have
low latency, they can reduce negative skewed profits when they are on the wrong
side of large trades.
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In summary, the two main objectives of short-term traders are (1) to be on the
right side when large traders initiate a large trade and (2) to get out of their positions
as quickly as possible when they are on the wrong side of large trades. Bigger “child
order size” of large traders increases the probability of short-term traders to be on
the right side, and faster “speed” of short-term traders reduces their negative skewed
profits when they are on the wrong side of large trades.
1.6.2 Large Trade Size and Order Exposure Probability
The model predicts that larger trades among the largest 1% of all trades are
more likely to be anticipated by short-term traders because the size of the large
trade is positively correlated with the size of its “child order”, and the bigger “child
orders” increase the probability of large trades being anticipated. By estimating the
probability of order-anticipation for different size groups, we test whether the larger
trades among the largest 1% of all trades are more likely to be anticipated.
The estimated β0 in table 1.5 does not monotonically increase as the size of
large trades increases. However, the extreme large trades among the largest 1% of all
trades are more likely to be anticipated by short-term traders than relatively small
large trades.
The model is inconsistent with the result in table 1.5 for a few possible reasons.
First, the model forces the large trader to schedule her order over only two periods. If
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Group(Largest%) Size Bound β0 S.E. t value Pr(≤ |t|) Nobs.
1.00 ∼ 0.60% [50, 62) 0.032 0.003 10.531 0.000 108,001
0.60 ∼ 0.20% [62, 100) 0.031 0.004 7.373 0.000 55,481
0.20 ∼ 0.10% [100, 128) 0.022 0.006 3.923 0.000 31,812
0.10 ∼ 0.05% [128, 154) 0.040 0.010 4.078 0.000 10,494
0.05 ∼ 0.01% [154, 228) 0.120 0.010 12.048 0.000 9,068
0.01 ∼ 0.00% [228,max) 0.120 0.018 6.577 0.000 2,727
1.00 ∼ 0.00% [50,max) 0.036 0.002 16.766 0.000 217,583
Table 1.5: This table tests whether the larger trades among large trades are more likely
to be anticipated. Large trades are defined as active trades by large traders among the
largest 1% of all active trades. We divide large trades into 6 groups based on their trade
size, and estimate the probability of order-anticipation, β0 for each group. The variable yt
is the direction of the tth large trade: Plus 1 is a buyer-initiated trade and minus 1 is a
seller-initiated trade. The subscript t indexes large trades. The variable x i,t is the position
of the ith short-term trader at the tth large trade: Plus 1 is a long position and minus 1 is
a short position.
large traders have a longer time horizon to manage their large order and if short-term
traders extract more accurate order flow information with a longer time series, the
larger trades among the largest 1% of all trades may be less likely to be anticipated
than the smaller trades. Second, the model implicitly assumes that liquidity provision
from noise traders is constant since we assume a constant linear price impact factor.
Since large traders have large demands, it is optimal for them to work their large
orders when the market is more liquid so that they can efficiently hide their order
flow while smoothing out their trades. In order to properly test the model prediction,
we need to measure the size of large trades relative to liquidity.
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1.7 Order-Anticipation Horizon
To show the order-anticipation horizon of short-term traders, we run predictive
regressions, unconditional of the execution of large trades, with 120 second time
intervals:




where y(t,t+1] is the number of buyer-initiated large trades minus the number of seller-
initiated large trades between time t and t + 1. The variable xt is the sign of the
aggregate inventories of short-term traders at time t. The variable x(t−i,t−i+1] is the
sign of short-term traders’ trades between time t − i and t − i + 1. Note that the
subscript (t′, t′ + 1] implies that t′ is not included, but t′+ 1 is included and that the
120 second time intervals cover the entire trading hours during the sample period.
The predictive regressions in table 1.6 show that the aggregate positions of
short-term traders are statistically significant predictors for the direction of large
trades that will arrive within 120 seconds. The positions of short-term traders are
a still significant predictor, even after controlling for the lagged trades of short-term
traders. This implies that the positions of short-term traders are sufficient statistics
to evaluate the predictability of short-term traders.
In panel B of table 1.6, we use the actual size of large trades for the dependent
variable and use the aggregate inventories and trades of short-term traders for the
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Panel A. Direction Panel B. Direction× Size
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept −0.06 −0.06 −0.06 −2.94 −3.15 −2.94
(−2.57) (−2.44) (−2.54) (−1.34) (−1.40) (−1.34)
xt 0.17 – 0.16 0.21 – 0.22
(7.49) – (6.04) (7.50) – (3.70)
x(t−1,t] – 0.09 0.01 – 0.16 −0.02
– (3.90) (0.34) – (6.42) (−0.28)
x(t−2,t−1] – 0.09 0.05 – 0.17 0.03
– (3.30) (1.83) – (5.47) (0.51)
x(t−3,t−2] – 0.05 0.03 – 0.14 0.03
– (1.83) (1.12) – (4.23) (0.60)
x(t−4,t−3] – 0.03 0.02 – 0.06 −0.02
– (1.18) (0.82) – (1.88) (−0.60)
x(t−5,t−4] – −0.02 −0.02 – 0.01 −0.03
– (−0.75) (−0.97) – (0.48) (−1.11)
Nobs 11,674 11,674 11,674 11,674 11,674 11,674
Adj. R2 0.0049 0.0017 0.0050 0.0056 0.0043 0.0057
Table 1.6: This table tests whether the aggregate inventories of short-term traders predict
the direction of large trades. We run predictive regressions with data points extracted in
120 second intervals between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. for 66 consecutive trading days of the
sample period: y(t,t+1] = β0xt +
∑5
i=1 βix(t−i,t−i+1] + ε(t,t+1], where y(t,t+1] is the number of
buyer-initiated large trades minus the number of seller-initiated large trades between time
t and t + 1. The variable xt is the sign of the aggregate inventories of short-term traders
at time t, and x(t−i,t−i+1] is the sign of short-term traders’ net trades between time t − i
and t− i+ 1. Note that the subscript (t′, t′ + 1] implies that t′ is not included, but t′ + 1
is included. In panel B, we use the actual size of large trades for the dependent variable,
and use the aggregate inventories and trades of short-term traders for the independent
variables. Newey and West (1994) t-statistics with 30 lags are reported in parentheses.
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independent variables. In these specifications, we still find the predictability of short-
term traders on the direction of large trades. As a robustness check, we run the
same regressions in table 1.6 with 5, 20, 40, 60, 120 and 240 second time intervals,
and report the results in table 1.7. In all specifications, we find that the aggregate
positions of short-term traders are statistically significant predictors for the direction
of large trades that will arrive in a short period of time. Furthermore, the coefficient
of xt monotonically increases as the time intervals become longer. This implies that
the order-anticipation strategy of short-term traders is not subject to their trading
speed.
1.7.1 Order-Anticipation Horizon across Large Trades
Order-anticipation by short-term traders can occur over a few large trades. Us-
ing vector autoregression with contemporaneous trades, this section analyzes order-
anticipation dynamics over ten large trades among large, short-term, and small
traders.
When taking the data to a vector autoregression model, large trades are used
as a partition of time domain to aggregate the active trades of large, short-term, and
small traders. Based on the market microstructure invariance hypothesis proposed
by Kyle and Obizhaeva (2013), the partition of time domain by large trades is more
appropriate than regular time intervals for analyzing order-anticipation dynamics.
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Panel A. Direction: y(t,t+1]
Covariate 5 sec 20 sec 40 sec 60 sec 120 sec 240 sec
Intercept 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.03 −0.06 −0.13
(−0.16) (−2.45) (−2.47) (−2.49) (−2.54) (−2.61)
xt 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.26
(8.16) (11.45) (9.42) (8.01) (6.04) (4.42)
x(t−1,t] 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.02 0.01 0.00
(0.78) (−0.47) (0.04) (−1.90) (0.34) (0.04)
x(t−2,t−1] 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 −0.03
(0.93) (1.92) (0.28) (0.45) (1.83) (−0.61)
x(t−3,t−2] 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 −0.01
(−0.22) (2.57) (−0.27) (1.63) (1.12) (−0.24)
x(t−4,t−3] 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 −0.04
(0.50) (0.73) (1.54) (0.47) (0.82) (−0.64)
x(t−5,t−4] 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 −0.02 0.03
(1.37) (1.80) (1.95) (1.13) (−0.97) (0.53)
Nobs 71,421 71,819 35,749 23,683 11,674 5,672
Adj. R2 0.0013 0.0026 0.0036 0.0034 0.0050 0.0045
Table 1.7: This table reports the order-anticipation horizon of short-term traders. We
run the predictive regressions in table 6 with various time intervals: 5, 20, 40, 60, 120 and
240 seconds: y(t,t+1] = β0xt +
∑5
i=1 βix(t−i,t−i+1] + ε(t,t+1], where y(t,t+1] is the number of
buyer-initiated large trades minus the number of seller-initiated large trades between time
t and t+ 1, where t is not included, but t+ 1 is included. The variable xt is the aggregate
inventories of short-term traders at time t, and x(t−i,t−i+1] is the net trades between time
t − i and t − i + 1, where t − i is not included, but t − i + 1 is included. For panel B, we
use the actual size of large trades instead of the number of large trades. Newey and West
(1994) t-statistics with 30 lags are reported in parentheses.
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The reasons are that (1) large trades provide a natural partition of time domain
that is endogenous to trading activity, and (2) large trades can be considered as
an exit point to short-term traders. If the market runs fast in business time, the
level of risk transferred per unit of calendar time increases and a large trade is more
likely to occur. Therefore, the time spans between two consecutive large trades would
become smaller when business time runs faster, controlling for trading activity across
the time spans between large trades.




{t,t+1} denote the net signed active trades of large,
short-term, and small traders, respectively, between the tth and the (t+ 1)th large
trade. Let’s define short-term price change ∆p{t,t+1} as (ln pt+1 − ln pt)× 104, where
pt is the price at the t























Our vector autoregression model with contemporaneous trades is
Y{t,t+1} = Λ{t,t+1} +
5∑
i=1
ΘiY{t−i,t−i+1} + ε{t,t+1}, (1.10)
where Λ{t,t+1} is a vector controlling for the price impact of contemporaneous trades,
and Θi is a 4 × 4 vector of coefficients capturing the relationship among the active
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trades of each trader group and the short-term price change.
Based on the model, short-term traders anticipate the order flow of large traders
instead of predicting the short-term price change directly. Consistent with the
model, when controlling for the contemporaneous active trades of x l{t,t+1}, x
s
{t,t+1}
and xm{t,t+1}, the lagged active trades of short-term traders cannot predict the short-
term price change, ∆p{t,t+1} directly.
The variable x s{t,t+1} is strongly negatively associated with x
s
{t−i,t−i+1} for 1 ≤
i ≤ 10. This is consistent with the summary statistics that short-term traders switch
their positions, either from a long to short position or vice versa, as frequently as
91 times per day. This negative correlation is also consistent with the model, in
which the short-term trader exits his positions when the large trader initiates a large
trade at her second trade. The variable x l{t,t+1} is strongly positively associated with
both x l{t−i,t−i+1} and x
s
{t−i,t−i+1} for 1 ≤ i ≤ 10. The positive autocorrelation of
x l{t−i,t−i+1} is due to large traders smoothing their trades. The positive correlation
between x l{t,t+1} and x
s
{t−i,t−i+1} implies that short-term traders anticipate the order
flow of large traders.
Short-term traders profit from the price impact caused by large traders. To
show this, the short-term price change ∆p{t,t+1} is regressed on the active trades of
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Covariate x Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat
x s{t,t+1} −0.015 (−3.36) – – – – – –
x l{t,t+1} 0.095 (50.52) – – – – – –
xm{t,t+1} −0.035 (−8.59) – – – – – –
x s{t−1,t} 0.000 (−0.09) −0.115 (−20.75) 0.244 (18.35) 0.157 (25.03)
x s{t−2,t−1} −0.002 (−0.45) −0.092 (−16.18) 0.185 (13.66) 0.075 (11.80)
x s{t−3,t−2} −0.008 (−1.71) −0.074 (−13.02) 0.155 (11.42) 0.068 (10.64)
x s{t−4,t−3} −0.006 (−1.43) −0.060 (−10.69) 0.090 (6.70) 0.026 (4.15)
x s{t−5,t−4} −0.004 (−0.93) −0.038 (−6.96) 0.064 (4.89) 0.014 (2.33)
x l{t−1,t} 0.003 (1.64) 0.010 (4.04) 0.112 (19.00) 0.038 (13.67)
x l{t−2,t−1} 0.005 (2.71) 0.003 (1.04) 0.067 (11.30) 0.024 (8.51)
x l{t−3,t−2} 0.000 (−0.15) −0.001 (−0.28) 0.024 (4.09) 0.009 (3.34)
x l{t−4,t−3} 0.001 (0.66) −0.004 (−1.60) 0.021 (3.59) 0.008 (2.85)
x l{t−5,t−4} 0.002 (0.82) −0.004 (−1.44) 0.033 (5.51) 0.010 (3.73)
xm{t−1,t} 0.004 (1.02) −0.019 (−3.65) 0.003 (0.24) 0.078 (13.43)
xm{t−2,t−1} 0.003 (0.68) −0.005 (−1.00) 0.041 (3.36) 0.066 (11.40)
xm{t−3,t−2} 0.002 (0.55) −0.022 (−4.33) 0.050 (4.10) 0.048 (8.19)
xm{t−4,t−3} 0.009 (2.17) −0.015 (−2.95) 0.055 (4.45) 0.047 (8.11)
xm{t−5,t−4} −0.005 (−1.12) −0.018 (−3.55) 0.037 (3.03) 0.042 (7.35)
∆p{t−1,t} 0.027 (5.12) 0.188 (0.28) 2.102 (1.32) 0.013 (0.02)
∆p{t−2,t−1} −0.005 (−0.90) −1.332 (−2.00) −0.624 (−0.39) −0.445 (−0.59)
∆p{t−3,t−2} 0.018 (3.41) −0.180 (−0.27) 3.049 (1.92) −0.161 (−0.22)
∆p{t−4,t−3} 0.018 (3.37) −0.041 (−0.06) 2.026 (1.28) 0.325 (0.43)
∆p{t−5,t−4} 0.004 (0.74) −0.061 (−0.09) −2.139 (−1.35) −0.366 (−0.49)
Nobs 35,438 – 35,438 – 35,438 – 35,438 –
Adj. R2 0.080 – 0.030 – 0.060 – 0.090 –
Table 1.8: This table analyzes order-anticipation dynamics among large, short-term, and











where ∆p{t,t+1} is the log return (bps) of midpoint of the bid-ask prices between the t
th and




{t,t+1} be the net signed active trades
of large, short-term, and small traders, respectively, between the tth and the (t+ 1)th large
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. Our VAR model is
Y{t,t+1} = Λ{t,t+1} +
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is a 4 by 4 coefficient
matrix, and the coefficients λ1, λ2 and λ3 in Λ{t,t+1} capture the contemporaneous price




{t,t+1} on the price change ∆p{t,t+1}, respectively. Every
first 5 large trades in a day are dropped since their lagged variables are missing. The unit
on the coefficients in the first column is 10−2 and the unit on the independent variables is
the number of contracts actively traded by the corresponding trader group.
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We intentionally omit x l{t,t+1} or x
m
{t,t+1} to examine which trader group contributes to
the profits of short-term traders when short-term traders exit their positions. When
omitting x l{t,t+1} or x
m
{t,t+1}, the dependent variable in regression (1.11) becomes the
price impact from the contemporaneous trades of the omitted trader group plus
the short-term price change that cannot be explained with contemporaneous trades.
If short-term traders profit from the price impact caused by a certain group, its
omitted active trades would result in positively biased estimates between x s{t−i,t−i+1}
and ∆p{t,t+1}.
When omitting x l{t,t+1} in regression (1.11), the short-term price change ∆p{t,t+1}
is strongly positively associated with x s{t−i,t−i+1}. We interpret this positive corre-
lation with the negative autocorrelation of x s{t,t+1} such that short-term traders an-
ticipate a sequence of trades of large traders by accumulating their positions in the
direction of the forthcoming large trade, and when large traders initiate a large trade,
short-term traders consider this as an exit point, in which they start to realize their
profits by liquidating their positions to other traders who respond to large trades.
Such order-anticipation dynamics show up in predictive regression (1.11) as if short-
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Panel A. Short-term Traders Active Trades at Large Trades t
(1) ∆p{t,t+1} (2) ∆p{t,t+1} (3) ∆p{t,t+1} (4) ∆p{t,t+1}
Covariate x Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat
x s{t,t+1} −0.015 (−3.36) 0.019 (4.36) 0.010 (2.25) −0.024 (−5.52)
x l{t,t+1} 0.095 (50.52) – – – – 0.091 (50.24)
xm{t,t+1} −0.035 (−8.59) – – 0.028 (6.83) – –
x s{t−1,t} 0.000 (−0.09) 0.021 (4.63) 0.016 (3.42) −0.006 (−1.28)
x s{t−2,t−1} −0.002 (−0.45) 0.016 (3.44) 0.013 (2.81) −0.005 (−1.02)
x s{t−3,t−2} −0.008 (−1.71) 0.007 (1.53) 0.005 (0.99) −0.010 (−2.21)
x s{t−4,t−3} −0.006 (−1.43) 0.003 (0.72) 0.002 (0.45) −0.007 (−1.65)
x s{t−5,t−4} −0.004 (−0.93) 0.003 (0.64) 0.002 (0.47) −0.005 (−1.05)
x l{t−1,t} 0.003 (1.64) 0.012 (6.04) 0.011 (5.55) 0.003 (1.28)
x l{t−2,t−1} 0.005 (2.71) 0.011 (5.31) 0.010 (4.99) 0.005 (2.47)
x l{t−3,t−2} 0.000 (−0.15) 0.002 (0.84) 0.001 (0.71) −0.001 (−0.26)
x l{t−4,t−3} 0.001 (0.66) 0.003 (1.56) 0.003 (1.44) 0.001 (0.55)
x l{t−5,t−4} 0.002 (0.82) 0.004 (2.20) 0.004 (2.05) 0.001 (0.70)
xm{t−1,t} 0.004 (1.02) 0.002 (0.56) 0.000 (0.01) 0.001 (0.31)
xm{t−2,t−1} 0.003 (0.68) 0.005 (1.08) 0.003 (0.64) 0.001 (0.15)
xm{t−3,t−2} 0.002 (0.55) 0.006 (1.45) 0.005 (1.09) 0.001 (0.15)
xm{t−4,t−3} 0.009 (2.17) 0.013 (3.06) 0.011 (2.72) 0.007 (1.80)
xm{t−5,t−4} −0.005 (−1.12) −0.002 (−0.45) −0.003 (−0.77) −0.006 (−1.48)
∆p{t−1,t} 0.027 (5.12) 0.029 (5.29) 0.029 (5.30) 0.027 (5.13)
∆p{t−2,t−1} −0.005 (−0.90) −0.005 (−0.86) −0.005 (−0.86) −0.005 (−0.89)
∆p{t−3,t−2} 0.018 (3.41) 0.021 (3.85) 0.021 (3.86) 0.018 (3.45)
∆p{t−4,t−3} 0.018 (3.37) 0.020 (3.59) 0.020 (3.58) 0.018 (3.37)
∆p{t−5,t−4} 0.004 (0.74) 0.002 (0.37) 0.002 (0.38) 0.004 (0.74)
Nobs 35,438 – 35,438 – 35,438 – 35,438 –
Adj. R2 0.080 – 0.010 – 0.010 – 0.080 –
Table 1.9: This table identifies a channel through which short-term traders predict the
short-term price change. The short-term price change ∆p{t,t+1} is regressed on the lagged
short-term price changes and the active trades of large, short-term, small traders. The vari-
able x l{t,t+1} or x
m
{t,t+1} are intentionally omitted in the regression. The omitted variables
result in biased estimates for the coefficients on x s{t−i,t−i+1}, which identify the indirect
channel, through which short-term traders predict the short-term price change ∆p{t,t+1}.
Panel B replaces x s{t,t+1} with x {t}, which are the aggregate positions of short-term traders
at the tth large trade. As a counterfactual analysis, panel C replicates panel B with ran-
domly chosen trades. Every first 5 large trades in a day are dropped since their lagged
variables are missing. The unit on the coefficients is 10−2 and the unit on the independent
variables is the number of contracts actively traded by the corresponding trader group.
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term traders predict the short-term price change between two consecutive large trades
when omitting x l{t,t+1}. What actually happens is that short-term traders anticipate
the order flow of large traders, and they profit from the price impact caused by large
traders by liquidating their positions when large traders initiate a large trade.
Even if x s{t−i,t−i+1} is positively associated with ∆p{t,t+1}, if the short-term
trader’s position is on the wrong side of large trades, short-term traders cannot
profit from the price impact incurred by large traders. To address this concern,
x s{t,t+1} is replaced with the aggregate positions of short-term traders at the t
th large
trade, x {t} in regression (1.11), and the results are presented in panel B in table 1.7.1.
The results in panel B in table 1.7.1 imply that short-term traders’ position
at the tth large trade is a strong predictor for the short-term price change between
the tth and the (t+ 1)th large trade. The variable x s{t−i,t−i+1} is no longer positively
associated with ∆p{t,t+1} when controlling for the positions of short-term traders,
x {t}. This is because the active trades of short-term traders, x
s
{t−i,t−i+1}, are highly
correlated with their positions, x {t}, which is a sufficient predictor for ∆p{t,t+1}.
The underlying mechanism in panel B in table 1.7.1 is that short-term traders take
positions in the direction of large trades before large traders initiate large trades,
and they profit from the price impact caused by large traders.
As a counterfactual analysis, panel C replicates panel B in table 1.7.1 with
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randomly chosen trades instead of large trades. Between randomly chosen two con-
secutive trades, short-term traders’ position, x {t} is negatively associated with the
short-term price change ∆p{t,t+1}. The results in panel B and C in table 1.7.1 imply
that except for large trades, the short-term price is likely to move against the position
of short-term traders and large trades are the main source of profits of short-term
traders.
1.8 Conclusion
This is the first paper to document that short-term traders anticipate the di-
rection of large trades, and they profit from the price impact caused by large traders.
When large traders initiate a trade, short-term traders correctly anticipate the di-
rection of the large trade 56.06% of the time. By either taking a long position in
advance of a large buy order or a short position in advance of a large sell order, short-
term traders profit from the price impact caused by the large trade. Furthermore,
we find that the aggregate positions of short-term traders are statistically sufficient
and significant predictors for the direction of large trades that will arrive within 120
seconds.
Based on the findings, we argue that order-anticipation trading occurs because
of order flow revealed by large traders rather than because of their speed slower than
short-term traders. Large traders inevitably reveal their order flow to reduce the
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price impact of large positions. This acts as a trading signal to short-term traders
Although this paper analyzes the index futures market of South Korea, the
main findings are driven by the foreign trading algorithms that would actively trade
in other international markets. Thus, we conjecture that the results can be replicated
in other major markets such as E-mini S&P 500 index futures market.
This paper does not evaluate overall effect of order-anticipation by short-term
traders on financial markets. Short-term traders clearly increase the transaction
cost of large traders, however they also contribute to the price discovery process by
competing for liquidity with large traders prior to large trades. After large trades are
made, short-term traders provide liquidity to other market participants who want to
actively trade to respond to new information revealed by large trades.
In our next paper, we ask how exogenous order flow frequency change affects
the order-anticipation of short-term traders. The KRX went through a structural
change on March 23, 2009, when the exchange server capacity was doubled from the
former system. Since the upgrade, market participants have received more frequent
limit order book information from once per 10 millisecond to once per 1 millisecond.
This structural change would exogenously give an advantage to short-term traders
as they receive more refined information about large traders who do not want to
reveal their order flow. Using this exogenous change as a natural experiment, we
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examine how this structural change affects order-anticipation dynamics, and how
order-anticipation by short-term traders affects price informativeness, short and long-
term volatility, market depth and liquidity.
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Chapter 2: An Invariance Relationship in the Number of Buy-Sell
Switching Points
2.1 Overview
Financial markets generate a voluminous amount of data on order placements
and quote updates. These data leave little doubt that trading patterns vary signifi-
cantly across securities. The market microstructure invariance hypothesis developed
by Kyle and Obizhaeva (2013) nevertheless claims that trading patterns in different
markets look similar when viewed from the perspective of an appropriate “busi-
ness” time clock. Market microstructure invariance predicts similarities in the dollar
amounts expected to be at stake, the scale of risk transferred, the magnitude of
transaction costs, and the size of profits.
In this paper, we test the market microstructure invariance hypothesis by ex-
amining variation in the aggregate number of buy-sell switching points across stocks.
We define the number of buy-sell “switching” points based on the number of times
that individual traders change the direction of their trading. We hypothesize that
the number of switching points is proportional to the rate at which business time
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passes. Under this hypothesis, market microstructure invariance predicts that the
aggregate number of switching points is proportional to the 2/3 power of the product
of dollar volume and volatility.
Using account-level data from the Korea Exchange (KRX) from 2008 to 2010,
we estimate the exponent to be 0.675 with standard error of 0.005. Invariance ex-
plains about 93% of the variation in the number of switching points each month
across stocks. Invariance patterns are especially pronounced for the subset of do-
mestic retail investors. A decomposition into the number of unique accounts and the
average number of switching points per account shows that it is the cross-sectional
variation in the number of accounts that exhibits the invariance patterns, while the
number of switching points per account is relatively stable.
2.2 Market Microstructure Invariance, Business Time, and Switching
Points
According to the market microstructure invariance hypothesis of Kyle and
Obizhaeva (2013), the business time clock is governed by the frequency at which
independent ideas—referred to as “bets”—are expected to arrive into the market-
place. In more active markets, bets arrive more frequently as the time clock runs
faster. As bets are placed at a faster rate, trading costs decrease and the average
distance between the market price and unobserved fundamental value decreases by
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an amount proportional to the square root of the arrival rate of bets. For informed
traders to make the same expected dollar profits per bet when trading costs fall and
price efficiency increases, they scale up the dollar size of their bets proportionally.
Holding volatility constant, invariance implies that the dollar size of bets increases
at a rate proportional to the square root of the number of bets per day; this implies
that, as trading volume varies across securities, the number of bets increases twice as
fast as the size of bets. Thus, if trading volume increases by a factor of 8, the number
of bets increases by a factor of 4 and the dollar size of bets increases by a factor of 2.
Since the business time clock—which ticks at the rate bets arrive—effectively speeds
up by a factor of 4, the speed with which business time passes is proportional to the
2/3 power of trading volume.
To adjust for differences in percentage returns volatility, Kyle and Obizhaeva
(2013) introduce the concept of “trading activity” denoted W . Trading activity is
defined as the product of daily dollar volume P · V (dollar share price times share
volume per day) and daily percentage returns volatility σ,
W := P · V · σ. (2.1)
It is a measure of aggregate risk transfer per calendar day. The expected number of
bets per calendar day—and thus the rate at which trading unfolds—is proportional to
W 2/3. Invariance implies that specific exponents of 1/3 and 2/3 govern relationships
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between trading activity W and various market characteristics such as bet size, bid-
ask spreads, market impact costs, speed of mean reversion, and price efficiency. These
relationships should be present in data on trading in financial markets.
The variable of interest in this paper is the aggregate number of buy-sell
“switching” points. For each month and each security, we count how many times in-
dividual traders change their trading direction from buying to selling or from selling
to buying and then aggregate those numbers across all accounts to find an aggregate
number of switching points for all traders in a given stock in a given month. If an
account trades a given stock in a given month but not in the previous month, then
we count its number of switching point as at least one. Each time an individual
account changes the direction of its trading from buying to selling or from selling to
buying, the number of switching points is increased by one. We denote the aggregate
number of switching points, summed across all accounts which traded stock i during
month t, as Sit.
We expect to find an invariance relationships in the cross-sectional patterns
of switching points. More precisely, consistent with the invariance hypothesis, we
hypothesize that Sit is proportional to W
2/3
it ,





where a is the same “invariant” constant for all stocks i and all months t. The
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constant a is scaled by W ∗ so that it quantifies the expected number of switching
points per calendar day for a hypothetical benchmark stock with trading activity
W ∗. To match the benchmark stock of Kyle and Obizhaeva (2013), we define the
benchmark stock to have a daily volume of one million shares, daily volatility of
2%, and price of 47, 440 KRW per share (approximately equal to $40 per share
given the average exchange rate of 1,186 KRW per USD between 2008 to 2010).
This hypothetical stock would be at the bottom of the top 50 stocks in the Korean
Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI). In this paper, we present evidence supporting
our hypothesis.
Our tests have a number of advantages over other tests for invariance rela-
tionships in trading data. Kyle and Obizhaeva (2013) document invariance relation-
ships for the size distributions of portfolio transition orders. These tests require the
identifying assumption that portfolio transition orders of institutional investors be
proportional to bets. Kyle, Obizhaeva and Tuzun (2012) document invariance rela-
tionships for the size distributions of “prints” of quantities traded in the Trade and
Quote dataset (TAQ). These tests rely on the even stronger assumption that print
sizes are proportional to bets. This assumption broke down after the 2001 reduction
of tick size to one cent and electronic order handling algorithms motivated traders
in the earlier 2000s to shred their larger “meta-orders” into trades equal in size to
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the minimum lot size of 100 shares or even smaller odd lots.
Although the aggregate number of switching points is hardly of any economic
interest in itself, it is a convenient tool for testing invariance. The tests based on the
aggregate number of switching points do not require strong assumptions about bets.
Kyle and Obizhaeva (2013) develop invariance hypotheses using the concept of
“bets.” In theory, a portfolio manager places a bet when he makes a statistically
independent decision to accumulate a position of a particular size. In practice, the
concept of a bet is difficult to map into data. Bets do not map easily into orders,
since one bet might be broken into many orders or spread across different accounts;
thus, bets do not necessarily show up in an obvious way in consolidated audit trail
data. Bets map even less easily into public data on trades, such as TAQ prints.
In contrast to the concept of a bet, the concept of a switching point can be
given a more unambiguous definition which maps into data in a straightforward
manner, provided trading data is available by individual account. There is some
ambiguity concerning the possibility that bets are spread across multiple accounts
or multiple bets are merged together; these possibilities may affect the number of
switching points, but the effect is likely to be proportional across stocks. Empirical
tests of cross-sectional variation based on the number of switching points only require
the structure of trading to be approximately preserved across securities, regardless
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of the specifics of how the flow of bets in the marketplace is expressed as a flow of
trades. Of course, switching point results may be affected by various market frictions
and institutional features such as minimum tick size, minimum lot size, the level of
cross-market arbitrage, and the industrial organization of entities participating in
trading financial securities. We examine these issues in later sections of the paper.
2.3 The South Korean Stock Market Data
Our study is based on trade-level and account-level data provided by the Korea
Exchange (KRX) for the period from February 2008 through November 2010. The
Korea Exchange was created after the integration of the Korea Stock Exchange, the
KOSDAQ Stock Exchange, and the Korea Derivatives Market in 2005. According to
the World Federation of Exchanges, the South Korean stock market is ranked 17th
in terms of market capitalization (about $1 trillion). Our sample includes only the
stocks listed in the KOSPI Market division at the Korea Exchange.
The KRX operates a single central limit order book for each KOSPI stock.
The dataset contains records of all orders placed, canceled, or modified as well as
all transactions executed. Records include blocking trading codes, short-sale codes,
trading system codes, and time stamps to the millisecond. Each message is linked
to the specific accounts involved and some additional information on account types
is collected, such as whether accounts belong to domestic retail investors, domestic
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institutional investors (financial investment companies, insurance companies, private
equity funds, etc.), or foreign investors. The KRX database has about 2.69 billion
messages and 1.29 billion distinct trade records during our sample period.
For our analysis, one observation is associated with each stock for each pe-
riod of 20 trading days from February 2008 through November 2010. In this paper,
we refer informally to each period of 20 trading days as a “month” (even though
the 20-trading-day period do not correspond precisely to calendar months). Using
this definition, our dataset covers 36 months. We begin with 24,441 observations,
one observation for each KOSPI stock and each month from February 2008 through
November 2010. We drop 2, 506 stock-month observations, because trading of some
stocks was discontinued during particular months, thus biasing downwards the num-
ber of switching points calculated for those observations. Our final sample has 21, 935
observations of stock-month pairs. There are on average 609 KOSPI stocks traded
during each month.
Using these data, we calculate for each stock i and for each month t the ag-
gregate number of accounts which trade Nit and the aggregate number of buy-sell
switching points Sit (summed across accounts). For each observation, we calculate
the dollar share price Pit as the product of the exchange rate between the South
Korean won and the U.S. dollar (KRW-USD exchange rate) and the closing KRW
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stock price. We obtain share volume Vit from the official daily public share volume
report. We calculate daily returns volatility σit as the sample standard deviation of
daily percentage returns during the same month. Trading activity Wit is defined as
Wit := Pit · Vit · σit. We define market capitalization based on the number of shares
outstanding at the end of each year. We calculate the annualized turnover rate νit
based on share volume in month t and shares outstanding at the end of the previous
year.
The dataset identifies three broad categories of traders: domestic retail in-
vestors, domestic institutional investors, and foreign investors. The number of ac-
counts Nit and number of switching points Sit represent sums across these three
investor types. We let αit denote the fraction of share volume due to domestic retail
investors.
There are in total 425, 440, 260 switching points in the sample, on average
19, 395 switching points per month per stock in the KOSPI universe: 94.2% from
accounts of domestic retail investors, 4.7% from accounts of domestic institutions,
and 1.1% from accounts of foreign investors. There are 5, 886, 557 distinct accounts
in the sample: 94% domestic retail investors, 5.1% domestic institutions, and 0.8%
foreign investors.
Table 2.1 shows summary statistics for the entire sample as well as the six
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Volume Group
Variable All 30th 60th 75th 85th 95th 100th
Price 36,839 13,957 26,530 37,815 47,599 77,869 119,947
Daily Volume (1B) 8.50 0.08 0.50 2.08 6.68 23.55 94.88
Volatility (%) 2.79 2.22 2.88 3.34 3.21 2.97 2.74
Capitalization (1T) 1.32 0.07 0.15 0.33 0.99 3.39 14.62
Annual Turnover (%) 263.70 49.23 193.23 429.22 553.08 495.40 363.91
Tick Size (BPS) 22.10 21.53 22.25 22.44 22.80 22.30 21.69
# Trades/Day 5,659 255 1,170 3,574 7,893 17,033 41,400
Avg Trade Size (1M) 2.87 1.21 2.06 2.51 3.75 5.90 10.37
Trades at Min Lot Size (%) 23.25 28.78 23.42 20.27 19.21 18.46 17.51
DR Volume (%) 78.32 86.63 81.57 79.09 71.95 62.31 54.71
DI Volume (%) 13.93 10.11 12.08 13.78 17.87 21.45 23.91
FI Volume (%) 7.75 3.27 6.35 7.13 10.18 16.24 21.38
Avg # Switches 19,395 930 4,072 13,353 28,501 57,567 136,710
Avg # Stock 609 176 185 93 62 62 32
# Observations 21,935 6,330 6,669 3,341 2,220 2,235 1,140
Table 2.1: The Summary Statistics: The table shows the price (KRW), daily volume
(1 billion KRW), volatility (%), market capitalization (1 trillion KRW), annual turnover
(%), percentage tick size (bps), number of trades, average trade size (1 million KRW),
percentage of trades of minimum lot size, the fraction of double-sided volume of domestic
retail investors, the fraction of double-sided volume for domestic institutional investors,
the fraction of double-sided volume of foreign investors, average number of switches per
month, average number of stocks, and number of month-stock observations. The average
exchange rate is 1, 186 KRX/USD during the sample period.
volume subgroups defined by the 30th, 60th, 75th, 85th, 95th 100th percentiles of aver-
age daily volume. The largest volume group is dominated by Samsung Electronics,
the largest stock in the Korea Exchange, which accounts for about 5% of the total
trading volume in KRW.
The average number of switching points per month increases by a factor of
147 from 930 for the lowest volume group to 136, 710 for the highest volume group.
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Trading activity Wit = Pit ·Vit ·σit increases by a factor 1, 464 from the lowest to the
highest group. Most of the variation in trading activity is due to variation in daily
volume, which increases from 0.08 billion KRW to 94.88 billion KRW. Volatility
does not change much across groups and the modest changes are not monotonic
across groups; volatility is 2.22 percent in the lowest group, 3.34 percent in the 75th
percentile group, and 2.74 percent in the highest group. These patterns are consistent
with invariance predictions, since 147 is approximately equal to 2/3 power of 1, 464.
The minimum lot size is equal to ten shares if the share price is below 50, 000
KRW and one share if share price is above 50, 000 KRW. In our sample, the median
size of trades is equal to 38 shares, implying that the minimum lot size constraint
is often binding. Indeed, about 23.25% of trades are executed in the minimum size
allowed; the fraction decreases from 28.78% for the low volume group to 17.51% for
the high volume group. As in the U.S. market, extensive order shredding makes it
difficult to test directly the invariance hypothesis by identifying bets in market data.
The tick size is determined according to a schedule.1 The average tick size is
about 22.10 basis points, approximately ten times larger than the typical tick size in
the U.S. stock market (e.g., one penny on $40 stock or 2.5 basis points). The average
1The tick size is equal to 1 KRW if share price is below 1,000 KRW; 5 KRW if share price is
between 1,000 KRW and 5,000 KRW; 10 KRW if share price is between 5,000 KRW and 10,000
KRW; 50 KRW if share price is between 10,000 KRW and 50,000 KRW; 100 KRW if share price
is between 50,000 KRW and 100,000 KRW; 500 KRW if share price is between 100,000 KRW and
500,000 KRW; and 1,000 KRW if share price is above 500,000 KRW.
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tick size is relatively stable across volume groups, ranging from 21.53 basis points for
low volume group to 22.83 basis points for high volume group. The large tick size is
likely to influence the trading behavior of market participants and have an effect on
the aggregate number of switching points.
Let ∆it denote the tick size in units of KRW for stock i in month t (e.g., ∆it
is 1 KRW if the share price is below 1,000 KRW). Following Kyle, Obizhaeva and
Tuzun (2012), we define effective relative tick size eit/e
∗ as the ratio of tick size in
basis points ∆it/Pit to the standard deviation of returns over one unit of business
time (which is proportional to σit/W
1/3
it ), scaled so that this ratio is equal to one for

















Another possibly important market friction is South Korea’s transactions tax.
The exchange collects a tax of about 30 basis points on the sale of securities, paid
by the seller. Trading fees of about 1.50 basis points are paid to on-line brokers on
executed orders.
Several stock indices are used as reference values for actively traded derivatives
contracts. The Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) includes all common
stocks traded on the Korea Exchange, with weights proportional to market capital-
ization. The KOSPI includes about 688 stocks. The KOSPI 50 index includes the
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50 largest companies listed on the Korea Exchange, approximately corresponding to
the 95th percentile and the 100th percentile volume groups in table 2.1). The KOSPI
200 index includes the 200 largest companies listed on the Korea Exchange, approx-
imately corresponding to the 75th percentile to 100th percentile volume groups in
table 2.1). The largest 200 stocks are often traded by investors engaging in cross-
market and index arbitrage strategies. The resulting basket trades will tend to affect
the number of switching points across stocks in the KOSPI 50 and KOSPI 200 uni-
verses. The identification of basket trades in the dataset is complicated, because the
dataset does not link accounts trading in the stock market to accounts trading in
the derivatives market.
2.4 Trading Activity and Switching Points
The main result of this paper concerns the empirical relationship between
the logarithm of the aggregate number of buy-sell switching points ln(Sit) and the
logarithm of scaled trading activity ln(Wit/W
∗) in the same month.
Figure 2.1 shows that all 21, 935 observations line up along a straight line whose
fitted slope of 0.675 (from an OLS regression) is very close to the predicted slope of
2/3. Observations for stocks included in the KOSPI 50 universe (black points) and
KOSPI 200 universe (blue points) are close to the fitted line as well. At the far right
corner of figure 2.1, the observations for the largest South Korean stock, Samsung
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Electronics, do not deviate much from that line. When Samsung Electronics is
compared to the stock with the least amount of trading activity, the difference in
trading activity is a factor of about exp(10), or approximately 22, 000. It is apparent
from visual observation that the data is relatively homoskedastic. For a given level
of the logarithm of trading activity, the logarithm of the number of switching points
for the less actively traded stocks deviates from the fitted line only slightly more
than for the more actively traded stocks. This slightly higher deviation may indicate
a larger estimation error in the estimates of expected trading activity for smaller
stocks.
A similar conclusion can be drawn from a regression analysis of the logarithm of
the aggregate number of buy-sell switching points ln(Sit) on the logarithm of scaled
trading activity ln(Wit/W
∗), clustering standard errors in the panel data regression
at monthly levels:
ln(Sit) = 11.156 + 0.675 · ln(Wit/W ∗) + εit. (2.4)
The estimated coefficient of 0.675 has a clustered standard error of 0.005, implying
that the hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to the predicted value of 2/3 is not
rejected (t = 1.67). The non-clustered standard error is 0.0012. The constant
term of 11.156 implies that benchmark stock has on average about 53, 000 buy-sell
switching points per month. The R2 of the regression is equal to 0.935.
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Figure 2.1: Aggregate Number of Switching Points ln(Sit) against Trading Activity
ln(Wit/W
∗): The vertical axis is ln(Sit). The horizontal axis is ln(Wit/W
∗), where
W ∗ = 106 ·40·1186·0.02 and Wit = Vit ·Pit ·σit. The fitted line is 11.156+0.675·ln(Wit/W ∗).
The invariance-implied slope is 2/3
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Figure 2.2 presents estimates from monthly regressions of the logarithm of
the aggregate number of switching points ln(Sit) on the logarithm of scaled trading
activity ln(Wit/W
∗). To make interpretation of results easier, the figure also contains
a horizontal line indicating the regression coefficient of 2/3 predicted by invariance.
All 36 point estimates of monthly regression coefficients are very close to 2/3. Only
15 out of 36 point estimates lie slightly outside of 95%-confidence bounds. Most
of these 15 months occur between October 2008 and November 2009, when the
South Korean market was most affected by the 2008 financial crisis. The estimated
coefficients exhibit persistence across months, fluctuating over time between 0.64 and
0.72.
We conclude that even though there is enough variation in the time series of
regression coefficients to reject the hypothesis that the coefficient is 2/3 every month,
the coefficient estimates are economically close to this predicted value.
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Figure 2.2: Time Series of Monthly Regression Coefficients: The time series of estimates
βs and their 95%-confidence intervals from 36 cross-sectional regressions ln(Sit) = ln(a) +
βs · ln(Wit/W ∗) + εit, where Sit is the aggregate number of switching points and Wit is
expected trading activity for stock i and month t. The time period is from February 2008
to November 2010. The invariance predicted slope is 2/3.
2.5 Number of Switching Points and Different Types of Traders
Figure 2.3 shows the relationship between the logarithm of buy-sell switching
points and the logarithm of scaled trading activity for different types of traders:
domestic retail investors, domestic institutional investors, and foreign investors..
Panel A of figure 2.3 shows results for the subset of domestic retail investors.
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These observations reveal a striking invariance relationship. The slope of the fitted
line 0.669 (t=0.4630 using clustered standard error, t=1.7903 using non-clustered
standard error) does not reject the hypothesis of equality to the predicted value of
2/3. Trades by retail investors dominate the results in figure 2.1, since domestic
retail investors account for about 94.7% of switching points in the entire sample.
Panel B of figure 2.3 shows results for the subset of domestic institutional
investors. These observations account only for about 4.7% of switching points of the
entire sample. They satisfy the invariance relationship less closely. The slope of the
fitted line 0.82 is higher than predicted coefficient of 2/3. The number of switching
points for stocks included in the KOSPI 50 universe is flatter than predicted by
invariance; the estimated slope for these observations is 0.332. The number of
switching points for stocks in the KOSPI 200 universe but outside of the KOSPI
50 universe is slightly steeper; the estimated slope for these observations is 0.532.
The flatness of the empirical distribution on the right side of the graph suggests
that cross-market arbitrage plays an important role in trading patterns of domestic
institution, especially for stocks in the KOSPI 50 universe. The small counts for
less actively traded securities (as revealed by horizontal lines corresponding to one
through ten switching points per month) introduces further distortions.
Panel C of figure 2.3 shows results for the subset of foreign investors. The slope
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of the fitted line 0.639 is lower than the predicted slope of 2/3, but not by much. The
points representing stocks included in KOSPI 50 and KOSPI 200 indices have much
flatter slopes; the slopes of the fitted lines are 0.451 for the stocks in the KOSPI
50 universe and 0.35 for the stocks in the KOSPI 200 universe but outside of the
KOSPI 50 universe. These slopes are similar in magnitude to the slopes for domestic
institutions, suggesting that cross-market arbitrage affects trading patterns of both
domestic institutions and foreign investors in a similar way. Since these observations
account for about 0.6% of all switching points, these patterns are also influenced by
small counts for less actively traded stocks, but this issue is less important for this
subset than for the subset of domestic institutions.
The main lesson from these results is that trading by retail investors, as mea-
sured by the rate at which switching points occur, reflects the passage of business
time in a manner strikingly close to the predictions of market microstructure invari-
ance. A conceptual issue raised by this result concerns whether invariance results
from the trading behavior of institutional investors or retail traders. As developed
by Kyle and Obizhaeva (2013), the invariance hypothesis is based on the idea that
institutional investors choose their strategies for placing bets and professional inter-
mediaries respond to these bets in a manner which leads to invariance relationships.
The powerful results in this paper suggests that the trading behavior of individual
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Figure 2.3: Aggregate Number of Switching Points ln(Sit) against Trading Activity
ln(Wit/W
∗) for different types of investors: The vertical axis is ln(Sit). The horizontal axis
is ln(Wit/W
∗), whereW ∗ = 106·40·1186·0.02 andWit = Vit·Pit·σit. Panel A presents results
for domestic retail investors; the fitted line is 11.056+0.669 · ln(Wit/W ∗). Panel B presents
results for domestic institutional investors; the fitted line is 7.391+0.82·ln(Wit/W ∗). Panel
C presents results for foreign investors; the fitted line is 6.643 + 0.639 · ln(Wit/W ∗).
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investors leads to invariance relationships as well.
The importance of retail investors may be an institutional characteristic specific
to the South Korean stock market. In the South Korean stock market, retail investors
account for a much larger share of trading than in most other countries, about 78.32%
of double-counted trading volume, i.e., about 39.16% of buys and 39.15% of sells.
Many large traders are classified as retail investors in the data, but they trade in a
manner similar to institutional investors; South Koreans often refer to large retail
investors as “super-ants”.
2.6 Effective Relative Tick Size, Index Inclusion, and Other Explana-
tory Variables
When the slope is fixed at the predicted value of 2/3 and only a constant term
is estimated, we obtain ln(Sit) = 11.123 + 2/3 · ln(Wit/W ∗) + εit; the mean squared
error is 0.190 and the R2 is 0.927 (where 1 − R2 is defined as the variance of resid-
uals divided by the variance of the demeaned data, i.e., 0.190/2.60). Neither the
mean squared error nor the R2 are different from the regression equation (2.4) in an
economically significant way, since the data closely fit the invariance relationship to
begin with. Thus, invariance explains about 93% of the variations in the logarithm of
the number of buy-sell switching points. We next study what explains the remaining
variation in the aggregate number of switching points.
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Table 2.2 presents results of panel data regressions of the logarithm of the
number of switching points by month and stock on five sets of explanatory variables:
1. a constant term;
2. a constant term and the logarithm of trading activity ln(Wit/W
∗);
3. a constant term; the logarithm of trading activity ln(Wit/W
∗); and the loga-
rithm of effective relative tick size ln(eit/e
∗);
4. a constant term; the logarithm of the three separate components of trading
activity, share volume ln(Vit/V
∗), share price ln(Pit/P
∗), volatility ln(σit/σ
∗));
the logarithm of effective relative tick size ln(eit/e
∗); the logarithm of the stock’s
turnover rate ln(νit/ν
∗); the logarithm of a fraction of volume executed by
domestic retail investors ln(αit/α
∗); dummy variables for stocks in the KOSPI
50 and the KOSPI 200 universes; and month fixed effects;
5. the logarithm of trading activity ln(Wit/W
∗) and stock fixed effects;
6. the logarithm of effective relative tick size ln(eit/e
∗); the logarithm of the com-
ponents of trading activity (share volume ln(Vit/V
∗), share price ln(Pit/P
∗),
volatility ln(σit/σ
∗)); the logarithm of the turnover rate ln(νit/ν
∗); the loga-
rithm of the fraction of volume executed by domestic retail investors ln(αit/α
∗);
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dummy variables for the stocks in the KOSPI 50 and the KOSPI 200 universes;
month and stock fixed effects.
All explanatory variables are scaled so that the estimated coefficients correspond to
the benchmark stock with V ∗ = 106, P ∗ = 40 · 1, 186, σ∗ = 0.02, α∗ = 1, ν∗ = 1/12,
and W ∗ = V ∗ · P ∗ · σ∗. The standard errors are clustered at the monthly level.
The most important results are the R2 and the mean squared errors of each
specification. The coefficients themselves are less important, because they are heavily
affected by multi-collinearity.
The main lesson of table 2.2 is that the addition of other explanatory variables,
including month and stock fixed effects, improves the R2 in a statistically significant
manner but nevertheless leaves some economically significant variation unexplained.
The initial variation of the dependent variable is equal to 2.60 (21, 395 observations).
In comparison with the R2 of 0.927 for in the first column (where only a constant
term is estimated), the remaining five specifications have R2 of 0.935, 0.936, 0.973,
0.969, and 0.984, respectively. The highest value of 0.984 is achieved in the fifth
specification which has 8 estimated parameters, 36 month fixed effects, and 686 stock
fixed effects (20, 665 degrees of freedom). The mean squared errors of the regressions
show similar variation across different specifications.
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Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 8.500 11.156 11.358 – – –
(0.059) (0.022) (0.046) – – –
ln(W/W ∗) – 0.675 0.659 – 0.679 –
– (0.005) (0.005) – (0.005) –
ln(e/e∗) – – 0.066 – – −0.047
– – (0.012) – – (0.007)
ln(P/P ∗) – – – 0.539 – 0.617
– – – (0.012) – (0.014)
ln(V/V ∗) – – – 0.727 – 0.802
– – – (0.016) – (0.018)
ln(σ/σ∗) – – – 0.245 – 0.228
– – – (0.008) – (0.011)
ln(ν/ν∗) – – – 0.049 – −0.023
– – – (0.018) – (0.020)
ln(α/α∗) – – – 0.590 – 0.562
– – – (0.025) – (0.025)
KOSPI50 – – – −0.028 – −0.030
– – – (0.020) – (0.017)
KOSPI200 – – – 0.120 – 0.127
– – – (0.026) – (0.027)
F.E. Month No No No Yes No Yes
F.E. Stock No No No No Yes Yes
Nobs 21,935 21,935 21,935 21,935 21,935 21,935
Adj. R2 0.927 0.935 0.936 0.973 0.969 0.984
MSE 2.926 0.190 0.188 0.078 0.091 0.047
Table 2.2: Explanatory Power of Other Variables: The explanatory variables are trading
activity ln(Wit/W
∗), share volume ln(Vit/V
∗), share price ln(Pit/P
∗), volatility ln(σit/σ
∗),
effective relative tick size ln(eit/e
∗), turnover rate ln(νit/ν
∗), the fraction of volume exe-
cuted by domestic retail investors ln(αit/α
∗), and dummy variables for stocks in the KOSPI
50 and the KOSPI 200 universes. Some specifications have month and stock fixed effect.
In the first column, 1 − R2 is defined as the variance of residuals divided by the variance
of the demeaned data, i.e., 0.190/2.60
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2.7 Decomposition into the Number of Accounts and the Number of
Switching Points per Account
By definition, the aggregate number of switching points is equal to the product
of the number of unique accounts traded in a given month and the average number
of switching points per account. The cross-sectional variation in those two factors is
the question we examine next.
Figure 2.4 shows the relationship between the logarithm of the number of
unique accounts ln(Nit) trading a given security i during a given month t and the log-
arithm of trading activity ln(Wit). The slopes of 0.625, 0.666, and 0.595 for domestic
retail investors, domestic institutions, and foreign investors, respectively, are slightly
lower than the value of 2/3 implied by invariance if the number of switching points
per account is constant. The higher intercept for domestic retail investors reveals
the exceptionally high level of retail participation in the South Korean stock market.
Domestic institutions and foreign investors are less active than retail investors. Many
stocks were traded by only a few domestic institutions or foreign investors during a
particular month, as reflected by clustering of data points around horizontal lines of
ln(1), ln(2), ln(3), and ln(4).
Figure 2.5 shows the analogous relationship for the average number of switching
points per account, ln(Sit/Nit). The clouds of data points for all three categories of
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Figure 2.4: The Number of Unique Accounts ln(Nit) against Trading Activity ln(Wit/W ∗)
for different types of investors: The vertical axis is ln(Nit). The horizontal axis is
ln(Wit/W
∗), where W ∗ = 106 ·40·1186·0.02 and Wit = Vit ·Pit ·σit. Panel A presents results
for domestic retail investors; the fitted line is 10.129+0.625 · ln(Wit/W ∗). Panel B presents
results for domestic institutional investors; the fitted line is 6.65+0.666·ln(Wit/W ∗). Panel
C presents results for foreign investors; the fitted line is 5.166 + 0.595 · ln(Wit/W ∗).
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traders—domestic retail, domestic institutions, foreign investors—are almost flat.
The slopes of 0.044, 0.154, and 0.043 for the three investor categories are close to
zero. The sums of the slopes in figure 2.4 and figure 2.5 are by construction equal
to the corresponding slopes in figure 2.3. There are more data points on the left
side of the subplot for domestic retail investors rather than the other subplots, since
domestic institutions and foreign investors avoid trading South Korean stocks with
low trading activity.
The clustering patterns along horizontal lines are less distinct than before be-
cause the horizontal lines correspond to both integers (such as one switch for one
account, two switches for one account, two switches for two accounts) and fractions
(one switch for two accounts, one switch for three accounts, two switches for three
accounts, etc.); nevertheless, the horizontal clustering is still visible on panel B and
panel C. Also, the data points in those two panels are somewhat symmetric relative
to each other.
We conclude that the invariance relationship arises mostly from cross-sectional
variation in the number of unique accounts, not from number of switching points
per account. This empirical fact is consistent with the spirit of the theoretical
model in Kyle and Obizhaeva (2013), where the endogenously determined number
of traders—each of whom makes decision to participate in the trading game, buy
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Figure 2.5: The Average Number of Switching Points per Account ln(Sit/Nit) against
Trading Activity ln(Wit/W
∗) for different types of investors: The vertical axis is ln(Sit/Nit).
The horizontal axis is ln(Wit/W
∗), where W ∗ = 106 · 40 · 1186 · 0.02 and Wit = Vit ·Pit ·σit.
Panel A presents results for domestic retail investors; the fitted line is 0.927 + 0.044 ·
ln(Wit/W
∗). Panel B presents results for domestic institutional investors; the fitted line is
0.742 + 0.154 · ln(Wit/W ∗). Panel C presents results for foreign investors; the fitted line is
1.476 + 0.043 · ln(Wit/W ∗).
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a signal of the same precision, and place exactly one bet—is shown to satisfy the
invariance relationship.
Yet, this similarity should be taken with a word of caution. A slope slightly
lower than 2/3 for the number of accounts may indicate that financial firms devote
more resources, generate better signals, and place bigger bets when trading more
active stocks. For example, domestic institutions and foreign investors may restrict
their trading to stocks present in relevant benchmark indices such as the MSCI
Emerging Markets Index, of which South Korea is one of the largest components.
The empirical patterns may also be influenced by trades of cross-market arbitrageurs
that tend to flatten the average number of switching points across stocks in indices.
2.8 Conclusion
The patterns documented in this paper strongly support the predictions of
market microstructure invariance. This evidence complements the evidence on the
invariance relationships in the U.S. market data documented by Kyle and Obizhaeva
(2013), Kyle, Obizhaeva and Tuzun (2012), and Kyle et al. (2014). It suggests
that invariance relationships hold in all markets, not just the U.S. markets. It
also suggests that the trading of individual traders, not just institutions, exhibits
invariance relationships.
The results in this paper are so precise that they look like empirical evidence
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from a physics journal rather than from an economics or finance journal. Yet, the em-
pirical patterns reported in this paper are not regularities which have an explanation
based on a mechanical interdependence among variables. If there is an alternative to
the market microstructure invariance hypothesis which better explains how the num-
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